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 ABSTRACT 
The relevance of the traditional collective management organizations has come to question in 
the digital age.  Since the beginning of the internet the CMOs have faced an enormous change 
in their operations and critics have put them in the spotlight, for being unable to provide efficient 
services for their members. This called for the EU to regulate them by competition. This study 
seeks to profile the main challenges they are facing as well as the possibilities to stay relevant 
in a dynamic and competitive music industry. To do so, relevant theory and interviews with first 
class leading professionals from within the CMO system have been used to evaluate the current 
situation. The paper concludes that there is a lot of areas that CMOs need to improve should 
they wish to remain on top of their game, to the benefit of the average creator.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It is a different future... You know what? That makes sense, doesn't it? Because we have such a 
changing world and the digital revolution is enormous. How can a collecting society continue to 
do what is has always done”? 
 
   ~Graham Davies, PRS Director of Strategy
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 
The first time I was acquainted with a Collecting Management Organisation was at the age of 14, 
when I decided to participate in a European music contest and won the first prize with my band. 
Quite naturally, I could not care less about the nature of the music business at that stage of my 
life. I was lucky enough to have family members who were involved professionally with theatre 
and have been living off their creative art for decades. The advice they gave was that I must 
ensure that there is a legal ‘protection’ for my music through a collecting management 
organisation in order to receive remuneration from the public use of my music on the radio, TV 
and from sales (CD,DVD sales).  My response was: “Is there such thing”? The feeling after my 
first pay was overwhelming, I found the whole idea of getting paid for making music, (that I 
would make anyway) simply too great. Shortly after this development I realised that I had an 
additional economic incentive to develop my creativity. I could use some of this remuneration to 
purchase a new computer and music equipment to record more demos.  
 
During my Master study, a lot of discussions were focused on the challenges the CMOs are 
facing because of digitization, however, a lot of that knowledge could not be found in books and 
holistic academic writings. This is quite paradoxical, as according to CISAC in 2017 the CMOs 
for composers, authors, performers and producers collected worldwide revenues of €8.6 billion, 
from which European CMOs accounted for 58.4% of global collections. These revenues exceed 
the collections of the recording industry, which has always been the central focus point in many 
books about digitalization in the music industry. CISAC’s numbers are not marginal and indicate 
the importance of CMOs in the music economy.  
1.2 Introducing the topic  
  
The CMOs are known for being non-profit organizations, traditionally responsible for collecting 
and distributing income from revenue streams for composers, lyricists, arrangers, translators and 
their publishers and supporting the development of creativity. 
          For approximately a century, these societies operated within their own national territory 
and worldwide through collaboration with foreign CMOs (their “sister societies”), to send money 
back and forth for the use of music made by foreign artists within their national borders. The 
functioning of this network was based on “reciprocal representation agreements”. In this 
framework, all CMOs would collaborate for the mutual interest of their domestic rights holders 
and were considered natural, de-facto monopolies in each of their respective countries.  
  
Throughout their long background, they proved that they were pioneers, not only for initiating 
the rights of the creators but also for adapting to new technologies that disrupted the traditional 
business models; from sheet music to gramophone, radio, portable cassettes and CDs - they made 
 sure there would be remuneration whatever the business model was. Evidence suggests that the 
CMO network in the analogue world was a practical and cost-effective system. It ensured that 
businesses around the world had access to music and revenue streams from public use and sales 
would be remunerated back to the rights holders. In essence, everyone was benefiting from that 
system. 
  
With the arrival of the Internet, European regulators instigated a new legal regime based on 
competition and reviewed the role of CMOs. The rationale behind this decision aimed to 
encourage CMOs to become more efficient whilst creating a dynamic digital market where 
music and services would bloom in the so-called European Single Market.  
  
 As an immediate effect, there was a fragmentation of rights for online music and can CMOs no 
longer license the world repertoire. Critics have argued that the difficulties have now been 
increased with regards to a concept of an efficient and competitive CMO and a dynamic, 
culturally diverse music market. 
  
At the same time, with the Directive of 2014/26/EU on ‘Collective Management of Copyright 
and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the 
internal market the’ the EU wanted easy, ‘one-stop-shop’ for licensing music online in addition 
to more efficient services and transparency in CMO operations. In essence, the EU has forced the 
CMOs to trigger an online “alter ego”; on the one hand forcing them to operate as they always 
have with i.e. physical sales and reciprocal representation, but on the other, act as competitors in 
the online sphere. 
 
1.3 Problem hypothesis and Research Questions 
  
If the EU decided to regulate the CMOs by competition and operate in a fragmented online 
market, this in theory could allow the most dominant groups, like the biggest CMOs or new, 
non-traditional competitors to overtake their operations. Such possibility would be unimaginable 
in the analogue world. As the music market is evolving to become almost entirely dependent on 
digital methods of distribution and consumption of music, the question becomes clear: what 
would the relevance of CMOs be in that world? Should they become obsolete or irrelevant, what 
would the impact be on creativity and cultural diversity? The second part of this hypothesis 
could be more positive: throughout the process of adapting to competition there may be 
possibilities to identify their own weaknesses and re-think collective management in order to 
stay relevant in the future. 
 
This study has two main objectives. First, to identify the current challenges CMOs face in the 
digital era by using theory and evaluating its validity with ‘straight from the source’ interviews 
with leading professionals. Based on the findings, the second objective is to discuss the 
possibilities for CMOs to stay relevant in a music industry that depends entirely on digital 
distribution and is regulated by competition. To do so, two main questions have been selected 
after many moons of collating relevant theoretical sources: 
 
   
1) What challenges are the traditional CMOs facing in the digital era?   
 
2) How can they stay relevant in the future? 
 1.4 Limitations and Delimitations 
 
This study focuses only on European CMOs for composers and authors rights which are subject 
to European policies. With regards to the interviews, the informants, although having 
international experience due to the nature of their responsibilities and background, they all work 
for a big and lucrative CMO (PRS and MCPS). The view on the given topics of a smaller, 
regional CMO executive would be desirable as it may have been relatively different. That was 
not possible due to time and financial constraints. The interviews took place during the summer 
break of academic year 2015/2016, as part of a work experience at PRS for Music in London, 
UK. The idea has initially been to join a second CMO for work experience and by entering their 
world, increase the chances of feedback as a fellow worker. It is unlikely that directors and 
leading professionals will have long interviews by phone with any postgraduate student out 
there. An example could be the rejection for an interview via Skype by a leading professional 
from Switzerland, popularly known for his contribution to technology and innovation.  
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the field of collective management of author’s rights in 
Europe lacks academic quantitative research with regards to the issues this paper aims to address. 
This has created certain limitations in terms of justifying a problem area with numerical data. It 
is the objective of this study, to identify certain problem areas in an abstract way and encourage 
future researchers for a quantified approach.  
 
 
Finally, during the collection and evaluation of the supporting theory new information was 
discovered that was related to the broader context of the topic. The CMO operations fall in the 
category of music and copyright, which is a fairly complicated subject related to law, economics   
culture, technology, politics, even philosophical matters. As this is a postgraduate study, certain 
boundaries have been set since it is not possible to analyse the realities of these areas which are 
in much discussion and in many cases, much dispute. 
 2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Background of collective management for composers and 
authors rights 
 
This part of the chapter seeks to profile the role and purpose of the collective management 
organizations in the analogue world. It begins with the background of authors rights until their 
establishment in nineteenth century Europe, followed by an overview of their operating structure 
and business model.  
 
2.1.1 The civil society: a prerequisite to CMOs 
 
In order to understand better the concept of a  CMO, it is important to provide a definition of 
civil society, as it is the foundation that has allowed the development of such organisations 
throughout the years. Organisations that support the rights of the creators would not have existed 
without recognition from the national and international law. Scholte (2001) reviews the term 
‘civil society’ in epochal order: first, it was used in 16th century English political thought, whilst 
a couple of centuries later the Hegelian idea of a civil society focused on the market and the 
relationship of an individual with property as a connection to personal freedom.  More 
contemporary approaches conceptualize the term with an affiliation to the non-profit and non-
commercial sector in society (Scholte, 2001).  
 
2.1.2 The statute of Anne 
 
 
From the very beginning of copyright law the main objective was to encourage people to be 
creative. It was established in Great Britain in 1710, with the Statute of Anne and focused on 
literary works. This provided the first ever legal protection for books and other writings for 
fourteen years after a work was first published. According to Kretschmer and Kawohl (2004), 
such legislation aimed to encourage literate and educated writers to compose and write useful 
books.     
 
On the other side of the sea, in France, copyright with relation to music was not by any 
means a tool to defend authors’ rights at the beginning. Music was reserved for the royal families 
but as soon as a market developed outside their courts and the people seized the means of its 
production, music became more like a commodity and the establishment of copyright was hence 
regarded as a fight of capitalism against feudalism (Attali, 1985 p.52).  
  
 
2.1.3 The first copyright bureau 
 
Some decades later the first copyright bureau was established in France. During that time, 
the writers were usually forced to give up on their natural right, eliminating any future revenue 
for the author of a theatrical play. It was Pierre Augustin Caron de Beumarchais, who refused 
these terms and sought support from his peers. They believed in the principle that as long as an 
artistic work generates revenues in its lifespan, then they must be related with that author during 
that lifespan (Piaskowski, 2010 p.171). Beumarchais and twenty other writers created a bureau 
for theater legislation, which was later established the Sociètè Des Auteurs et Compositeurs 
Dramatiques (SACD) in France, 1777. With the statute of the 21st of July 1793, there was a 
stronger protection of intellectual property rights in place and purchasing rights with a one-time 
fee for all future use of a theater play was forbidden (Piaskowski, 2010 p.175). This development 
marked the beginning of a more coherent copyright law, which was then extended for music . 
 
2.1.4 CMO for author’s rights and their purpose 
 
When Ernest Bourget along with P.Henrion and V.Parizot, refused to pay extra for 
having to listen to their own music being performed at Les Ambassadeurs, a small cafè with live 
music in Paris, the three men referred to the law of 1791 - that they had in fact the right to be 
compensated for the use of their works. Their following action was to sue the manager and claim 
damages. The court ruling in 1848 in their favour and the support of the court of appeals in 1849 
concluded that all musical works must be protected under the law. (Attali, 1985 p.77). This 
development in France became a strong incentive to form the first union for the protection of 
music creators funded by a publisher named Jules Colombier, in 1850. A year later, on February 
28th 1851, more writers (publishers were exluded from this initiative) created a union that would 
become known as SACEM.  (Piaskowski, 2010 p.172) 
 The statement below declares their main objective and purpose: 
 
“...to defend the common rights of all composers and lyricists, with or without the co-operation 
of their publishers, in relation to the owners of public establishments where their literary and 
musical works are performed”    (Wallis, 2004 p.103) 
 
The reasons that lead to this development appeared to be necessary because the system of 
patronage (usually aristocrats supporting/funding artists) - was overtaken by a market economy 
in the 1800s. At that time, the use of printed sheet music was popular and was distributed for the 
purpose of domestic performances, usually for parlour piano and voice (Laing, 2004 p.70). That 
meant that it could be used inside a house or, as mentioned above with the case of Ernest 
Bourget, used at pubs and cafeterias, hence public performances. 
 2.2 OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS 
 
2.2.1 Operational functions of a national CMO 
 
There are three main pillars that CMO operations are laid upon. According to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (2017), these are: 
 
a)The administration of rights: where the CMO collects and keeps track of personal and 
ownership information about their members and their musical works. This may require active 
communication with their own members and sister societies who, upon request, may either 
confirm or query, for example, the correct share split for writers affiliated with different societies 
and publishers. The CMOs also play an important role with regards to counterclaim issues. In 
certain situations they may enquire additional information from sister societies to find a 
resolution. In that sense, they are the traditional gatekeepers of IP data because of their 
established international network of reciprocal agreements.  
 
b)The licensing of rights: the CMO negotiates the terms of a licensing deal with users who need 
music. The CMO will discuss the terms of that deal and a fee for that license. Those who seek 
licenses vary, from digital service providers, websites, TV and Radio stations to public concerts, 
museums and cafeterias. The CMO must also be active with regards to the enforcement of rights, 
for example, to investigate and identify businesses (offline and online) that use music but do not 
have a license. Finally, the CMO must ensure that certain businesses must send usage reports, 
from which distribution is determined.  
 
c) The collection and distribution of revenue to rights holders: the CMO is responsible to collect 
the revenue from all their licensing agreements on behalf of local and foreign authors and 
distribute it accordingly. The basis for a fair distribution may be complicated to estimate, but  
societies use the logs of music played on i.e  Spotify or TV/Radio stations, to split the revenue 
and send it out to the rights holders they represent. These operating functions serve as one 
bundled service for their members. 
 
2.2.2 CISAC’s professional binding rules  
 
CISAC, is the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers. CISAC has 
developed a set of agreement rules and organizational tools that all its members (239 authors’ 
societies in 123 different countries) must comply with. Koskinnen-Olsson and Lowe (2012) 
summarize  these as follows: 
 
·    No discrimination between members of sister societies regarding collection and distribution 
of royalties 
·    An agreement on commission charges  
 ·    Cultural and social deductions for the support of local music (10% on average) 
·    Data exchange programmes 
·    Active communication between their departments 
.   Negotiating the terms of the use of music with the users (e.g. TV - Radio - Public Stores - 
Streaming Services) 
.     Issuing licenses 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Legislative framework and CMOs 
 
European CMOs have two types of regulations, one that comes from the state and another one 
that must conform with the European Commission. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, 
the concept of a civil society is very significant and the state governments are responsible for the 
enforcement or amendment of those rights. Regarding music and authors’ rights, although 
regulated on a national level, in practice they reach a global audience and hence the applicability 
of those rights is inevitably also international. (Koskinnen-Olsson and Lowe, 2012 p.15). 
Following from that, on EU level, a survey has shown that even between EU member states there 
are considerable differences between member states with regards to how they regulate those 
rights and the system of rules that national CMOs have to follow (Guibault and Van Gompel, 
2010, p.125). The scope and impact of these differences will be discussed in the last paragraphs 
of the chapter and interview analyses.  
 
2.2.4 Author’s rights in collective management  
 
In their article for WIPO, Koskinnen-Olsson and Lowe (2012) give a description of the two main 
rights within a CMO: 
 
-Performing right: Public performance of music via analogue and digital means, such as TV and 
Radio stations, streaming, live concerts, background music at public places (bars, cafeterias etc.). 
The performing rights societies are usually assigned this right from composers, lyricists, 
arrangers, translators etc. by agreement (Koskinnen-Olsson and Lowe 2012, p.20). 
 
-Mechanical right: The right to ‘mechanically’ reproduce and distribute a sound recording. In the 
analogue world, these were linked to physical sales (CDs, vinyl records etc.). A digital sale or 
‘download’ is also considered a sale but it involves a smaller percentage of performing right. 
When an artist is published, the publisher traditionally claims from the mechanicals rights 
Koskinnen-Olsson and Lowe 2012, p.20).   
 
The percentage division between mechanical and performing may vary from country to country 
regarding downloads and streaming Most often a stream is 75% performance and 25% 
mechanical while a download (sale) 75% mechanical and 25% performing (Lindvall, 2014) 
 
  
More rights outside authors’ societies: 
 
-Neighbouring/related rights: these are the rights of the performing artists and producers (legal 
entities, usually record labels and broadcasting organizations). They are not the original authors 
but have contributed with their own aspect of musicianship. These rights are also subject to the 
international treaties. The Rome Convention (1961) extended the same reciprocal principles of 
the Berne Convention for performers, music producers and broadcasters and as of 2016, 92 
countries have joined this treaty according to WIPO (2017).  
 
2.2.5 CMOs as “bearers” of culture 
 
The role of the national CMO as a contributor to cultural diversity is well known but the ways 
societies have developed mechanisms to support this, can differ quite a lot. In their working 
paper, Laing, Schroff and Street (2015) focused on such differences and noted that although most 
CMOs support creative activities and cultural events, usually associated with niche repertoires 
(i.e. contemporary classical, jazz) in order to promote young/unknown talent, the market tends to 
neglect these efforts, something that is shared by GESAC (Laing et.al, 2015 p.17). Those 
initiatives seek to improve the quality of culture - not simply to give an economic reward to 
creativity, which indicates a strong element of solidarity for the minority genres and artists who 
can otherwise struggle to develop their creativity (Laing et.al, 2015 p.16) For example, 
SACEM’s model, traditionally supported by the French governments, has always been viewed as 
the most noble towards cultural diversity. They have been implementing laws whereby income 
from levies on private copying is used to encourage new creativity and have airplay threshold to 
non-francophone music, ensuring the support of domestic talent. Except their domestic affairs, 
France has also been using the word ‘cultural exception’ during international trade negotiations 
to defend this principle (Laing et.al, 2015 p.17). The model of France is the strongest in that 
regard, but more CMOs have similar agendas as part of their cultural diversity policies (such as 
TONO in Norway). 
 
2.2.6 Reciprocity and Solidarity 
 
SACEM’s approach on collective management of rights gradually sparked initiatives from other 
countries to form similar institutions in their territories. The performing right, in many ways, 
promoted the notion of reciprocity: in order to protect the rights of creators whose music was 
performed outside national borders, the cooperation between national collectives was necessary. 
As a result, the Berne Convention was signed in 1886 and the author’s rights were officially 
recognised by law, whether that was a public performance or a sale (sleeve notes and mechanical 
reproduction). Each country that signed the treaty had to agree on the same reciprocal terms and 
implement it into national law (Laing, 2004). 
 
The Berne Convention provided two types of copyright protection for the member countries:  
 
 a) ‘National treatment’, where foreign authors would be treated equally like domestic authors 
(Laing, 2004 p.73)  
b) ‘reciprocal agreement’, where the foreign author would receive the same protection as in their 
own country. Laing (2004) provides an example for the second, with the private copying levy 
that exists today in some European countries. In practice, that means a writer can receive 
remuneration from private copying only from countries that also include copyright levees in their 
national law (Laing, 2004 p.73). 
Reciprocity required the overcoming of differences between the signatory states. The process of 
adaptation of the French model was not embraced very quickly due to different perceptions on 
the principle. Other countries were sceptical on the performing right - particularly the United 
Kingdom. British publishers could not agree because in their view a music performance was a 
way to promote a work to boost sales of sheet music (Laing 2004 p.72). This disagreement 
caused SACEM to react by reporting the UK to the committee of the Berne Convention 
requesting that the UK should collect and remunerate French artists, whose music was performed 
publicly in British territory, like France agreed to do for all foreign writers. This difference 
between SACEM and PRS proved at an early stage, that the collective management of rights is a 
complex area to operate in because each country might have different views on the matter, which 
may be affected by ethno-cultural reasons.  
Since national CMOs used to only operate within their own geographical territory, the 
need for the use of services outside their territory was essential for collecting revenue. The 
principle of reciprocity in fact derives from the statute of Anne, as in Great Britain foreign 
residents were granted the same protection of rights with British nationals and all international 
copyright conventions followed on the same principle (Wallis et al., 1999 p.13).  Today, when a 
member of TONO writes a song that becomes very popular in Spain, SGAE (TONO’s sister 
society) collects the remuneration on behalf of TONO and vice-versa. Wallis (1999) describes 
this system subject to universal supply principles, such as the letter post, electricity, 
telecommunications, drinking water and transportation. He suggests that the element of solidarity 
is very strong in such system and is applied in two senses: one between CMOs (and their 
reciprocal agreements) and one between their members (Wallis et al, 1999 p.15) All members are 
treated more or less equally. They charge the same flat rate percentage of revenues that they 
collect regardless of quantity or profitability. Although this flat fee does not reflect cost 
differences of collection, it has purposely been used for solidarity with the less popular artists, 
whose income is much harder to monitor than the popular ones. Therefore the costs to monitor 
the use of music are not in proportion to popularity. Whenever the data is poor (for example, a 
cafeteria playing background music and paying an annual fee), then distribution is determined by 
analogy (Wallis et al, 1999). Then the CMOs must ‘guesstimate’ how much of that money 
coming from the cafeteria should go to the small and the big artist. The type of music source is 
also being taken into consideration.It is more likely that revenue from an Opera Concert Hall will 
not go to a black metal band, so they divide it by sector before it is distributed.  
 
2.2.7 Licensing music in the analogue world 
 
‘Blanket licenses’ has been the popular term in the music industry to describe the bulk of rights 
licensed in one agreement (an all-you-can-eat musical buffet). This has been a standard practice 
for CMOs since their advents. Although the performing right became part of the French national 
 law, it would not be possible for each writer to monitor where their music was performed 
individually; having an organisation that included a big variety of writers would simplify the 
process of granting access to music, covering not just some songs, but providing the whole 
repertoire. What that meant in practice was that there was a ‘win-win’ situation for the CMO (on 
behalf of rights holders) and the users (bars, cafés and other public venues) (Wallis, 2004 p.103-
4). The CMO would make sure that there would be a negotiation and financial settlement before 
giving the user access to use songs for public performances. In addition, by having to go to only 
one place (national CMO), the users made sure that they could use all the music that they wanted 
legally.  
 
These terms would eventually establish a national and natural monopoly, because there was no 
other strong authoritative source that a user could get access to music from legally. Such de-facto 
monopoly was tolerated by the anti-monopoly agencies throughout the analogue era because 
licensing from a ‘one stop shop’ was very practical for the users to do business deals (Laing, 
2004 p.72). National governments were also on the same track for a long time and accepted the 
monopoly of the CMOs because they took upon themselves the responsibility to support and 
promote culture in the society (Wallis et al. 1999, p.12).  Another argument for blanket licensing 
is that it can significantly reduce transactional costs for both licensor and licensee since there is 
only a one-time fee. Then the user can have all the music out there, covering national and 
international repertoire. From there on, there is very little extra cost to add i.e. additional 
repertoire once an initial investment for setting up the licensing structure has been made. (Towse, 
2012, p.7). This practice has also been encouraged from the state courts around the world. 
According to Katz (as cited in Towse, 2012) it worked as a defensive mechanism against 
unauthorised use. Should there have been individual licensing practices, this fragmentation 
would create a considerably bigger risk of copyright infringement.  
 
Finally, another argument for blanket licensing is about solidarity. When CMOs negotiate a deal 
for a license collectively, the repertoire includes individual creators (smaller or niche artists) that 
their best way to to receive a reasonable reward for the use of their works is by being part of a 
bigger repertoire (including high-profile and low-profile earners). The view of Kretchmer (as 
cited by Towse, 2012 p.12) is that individual would be forced to accept a much lower fee on a 
‘take it or leave it’ basis. If a CMO was to start issuing individual licenses or different categories 
of licenses based on individual artists, for example: one license for the super earners, one license 
for the small earners and so on - that  would indicate a clear discrimination between members 
and produce large imbalances in terms of economic and cultural value (price and repertoire). 
   
 
In summary, the evidence suggests that blanket licensing that included all types of music has 
been working relatively well in the analogue world. Except reducing transaction costs for both 
rights holders and users, it has also been a convenient way to collect funds even when the rights 
holder had not been identified - it was all inclusive. Consequently, it ensured stable money flow 
in a market economy and cultural diversity in society and in commerce, as a service could offer 
the local market all the foreign repertoire. This system ensured the promotion of creativity and 
provided incentives for musicians, publishers and other actors contributing to the development of 
musicianship, to essentially, keep creating and producing music.  
 
 2.2.8 Arguments against blanket licensing through CMOs 
 
KEA European Affairs (2006) presented the arguments against blanket licensing practices as per 
below: 
 
- It creates national monopolies: an anathema to competition authorities 
- It reduces competition for price and services 
- Their position as de facto monopolies minimizes their incentives or willingness to adapt 
to new market realities and invest for efficiency.  
- They have always been associated as “just another tax” with negative image from small 
businesses.  
  (KEA, 2006 p. 31) 
 
 
There is very small evidence regarding arguments against blanket licensing in the analogue 
world. A lot of them started appearing after digitalization and were related to proposed policies 
based on competition. These shall be discussed more thoroughly in the second part of the 
chapter, which focuses more on legislation with regards to competition in the digital world.  
 
 
2.3 Digitalization 
 
 
The paper has so far projected the concept and purpose of a CMO in the analogue world. This 
chapter first portrays brief concepts of digitalization. The second part of the chapter discusses 
legislative developments and their effects on the traditional CMO operations. A summary of 
issues for CMOs will be presented at the end of the chapter. 
 
2.3.1 Explaining digitalization 
 
There have been many ways digitalization has been explained in contemporary literature, but the 
most common concept around the area of digitalization is highly related to the Internet and the 
digitalization of content (Wikström, 2013 p.8). 
2.3.2 Characteristics of digital content 
 
As means of cultural products, digital content falls in the category of information goods 
(Wikström 2013), for the true value simply lies on the information (the intangible) and not the 
physical product that used to carry that information (the CD, USB sticks etc.). From an 
economics perspective, information goods are also referred to as ‘public goods’ because they 
have no “unique” economic value (Towse 2004 p.58). For example, listening to a song on the 
 ipod or smartphone does neither hinder another person from listening to the same song, nor 
decrease its value after it has been consumed.  
 
 Morreau (2009) summarizes the characteristics of digital content with two properties: 
 
- It is very cheap (almost zero cost) to reproduce.  
 
- It is non-rival, because once it has been copied it can be shared with anyone who has access to 
the same online network.  
 
Another approach supporting the above come from Shapiro and Varian (as cited in Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee, 2014 p.57), who note that in the online world information is costly to produce but 
very cheap to reproduce. An example here can be the costs to produce a hollywood movie which 
(maybe be in millions of dollars) but the costs to reproduce them into digital files are practically 
close to zero.  
 
2.3.3 Characteristics of new vs old music economy 
 
The scale of disruption becomes apparent when looking at the differences between the old and 
the new economic model in the music industry. Wikström (2013) outlines the elements of the 
‘new’ (online) vs ‘old’ (offline) music economy as per below.  
 
The old music economy consisted of three elements: 
 
a) Companies had control over their physical products and hence reducing their 
unauthorized use.  
 
b) The recorded music economy depended entirely on sales of physical products ( i.e CD’s 
cassettes etc.) 
 
c) Technological  innovation barriers prevented the average creative amateur to take part in 
the music market.  
 
On the other hand, the new music economy altered all the above with: 
 
a) High connectivity and low control; a song uploaded on Youtube or in any other website 
can be shared by anyone who has Internet access. Once that song enters the abyss of the 
online world, it can be reproduced and shared infinitely while tracking down its usage 
and how many times it has been copied becomes very difficult to estimate.  
 
b) The vast dissemination of content on the internet created an economy based on digital 
services (software) which aggregate content instead of machines (hardware) that 
manufactured  physical products for sale purposes on per item basis.  
 
c) Ease of access to technological innovations, allowed for an increased number of amateur 
 creators to make more music and participate in the global market, every time they, for 
example, upload their music on digital services, such as Youtube, Soundcloud and a lot 
more. This development is also related to ‘Moore’s Law’ in 1971, which suggested that 
computers would become twice as efficient every eighteen to twenty-four months while 
becoming less costly (Gibbs, 2015)  
 
The new elements in the music economy constituted radical change compared to the analogue 
business model, with new ways to access and distribute music. This reflects the concept of 
disruptive innovation in a market economy.  Disruptive innovation is characterized by 
technological discontinuity that brings major changes with regards to the price and performance-
tier of the industry, while changing the form of the products and the processes of producing and 
distributing it (Moreau, 2013 p.20). These changes may cause greater challenges for vertically 
integrated companies who control the value chain affected by disruptive innovation. Such 
companies find it more difficult to adapt to disruptive innovations and invest in technologies that 
will facilitate the new business models arisen by disruptive innovation. The risks are extremely 
high for them to render obsolete all actors in the value chain (Moreau, 2013).  
 
2.3.4 Streaming and dissemination of music 
 
David Bowie’s prediction in 2002 was that music would become a commodity like electricity or 
water was a statement that Krueger (2005) turned it into a theory (The Bowie Theory). This 
theory is not far from today’s reality. As Simon Frith put it: 
 
 “There is hardly any limit to the kind of music we get to hear in everyday life: it is not just that 
music is everywhere but that all music is everywhere” (Frith, 2004 p.173). 
 
 According to IFPI (2016) digital music consumption via streaming is exploding worldwide and 
it has finally come to much clearer direction as the most promising of business models in the 
digital age. In addition, their latest report provides a graph that shows the constant growth of 
streaming from years 2012 to 2016: 
  
    (source: IFPI, 2017)  
 
The exponential growth of streaming is also taken into consideration when looking into the 
future of the music industry. A financial research suggests that with streaming being the driving 
force, the rising popularity and sophistication of streaming platforms, the global music economy 
will boost to $104 billion by year 2030 (Goldman Sachs, 2016). That has made streaming the 
most promising business model in the music industry.  
 
2.3.5 Borderless Internet 
 
While digitization has changed the form of the cultural products, which now require digital data 
processing instead of machinery and manual methods, the internet enabled the transnational 
environment for the communication of data. The internet has no geographical borders, not 
because it is not running on a cloud, as people tend to misconceptualize Andrew Blum (2012). 
writes that in reality, its structure is very physical, practical and very familiar to its predecessor 
technology, dating back to Simon Morse, who invented a way to transform electricity into 
signals with the telegraph in 1850. The internet was designed as network of networks, where 
computers connect and communicate with one another, regardless of the geographical location of 
the access point (Andrew Blum, 2012).  
 
2.4 CMOs in the digital era 
 
As seen in chapter one, the CMOs in the analogue world used to operate within their national 
territories, administering their domestic repertoire and the foreign via their reciprocal 
agreements. As soon as the internet made the distribution of music outside the national borders 
 possible, the collective management system based on territorial control became unsuitable 
(Haunss, 2013 p.4). Digital services could operate entirely online and the national structures 
based on reciprocal agreements between CMOs became insufficient to accommodate protection 
for music consumption online.  
 
To meet with the new challenges, CISAC initiated the Santiago Agreement (2000) for the 
performing rights and BIEM the Barcelona agreement (2001) for the mechanical rights. Here it is 
important to examine their collective approach, to better understand the contrasting environment 
and issues that will be discussed later. 
2.4.1 The Santiago agreement 
 
Proposed in Chile, the Santiago Agreement sought to extend the reciprocal representation for  
offline use of music, to online. It included the following features:  
 
1)Any user (i.e. DSP) given that they operate entirely online,(hence no physical borders), would 
be able to sign an agreement with any CMO and the scope would be worldwide instead of 
national. (Wortley, 2015 p.35). The user would however still be able to use the repertoire of all 
CISAC signatory members. In addition, Moscoso (as cited in Wortley, 2015) notes that a CMO 
would negotiate an agreement and include the tariffs for the other countries that the DSP wished 
to operate. The end result of the agreement would be more or less the same for the DSP because 
these societies would collaborate, working on the basis of their local tariffs. A year later the EC 
Competition Commission was notified about the initiative of the CMOs to extend their reciprocal 
agreements in the digital world. Although the EC initially supported ‘one stop shop’ solutions 
due to the benefits of ‘blanket’ licensing practices, they nonetheless declared the Santiago 
Agreement to be anti-competitive and hence, illegal. For the EC, encouraging competition 
between national CMOs would boost efficiency whilst giving the freedom of choice for rights 
holders and DSPs.  
2.4.2 BIEM Barcelona Agreement 
 
Adopted in 2001, the  BIEM Barcelona Agreement established a multi-territorial licensing 
system between CMOs about the mechanical rights of reproduction in the online world 
(Bonadio, 2012 p.6)  
 
Both initiatives from the collecting societies to extend their reciprocal agreements in the online 
world were stopped by the EC, and eventually the Santiago and BIEM Barcelona Agreements 
expired in 2004. 
 
 
2.4.3 The European Commission’s 2005 Recommendation  
  
Since the proposed solutions by the CMOs were disregarded, the European Commission decided 
 to propose the ‘Recommendation on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services’.Taking a closer look at the 2005 
Recommendation is important towards understanding its impact on CMO operations due to its 
new elements of the fragmentation of rights and competition. 
 
2.4.4 Explaining Recommendation  
 
According to the European Commission a Recommendation in community law is a: “legal 
instrument that encourages those to whom it is addressed to act in a particular way without 
being binding on them. A recommendation enables the Commission (or the Council) to establish 
non-binding rules for the Member States or, in certain cases, Union citizens” (EC, 2017). 
 
A Recommendation from the EC, although not binding, it may well have greater effects on 
national legislation than a Directive as its contents are far reaching (KEA, 2006 p.43). A 
Directive is a legislative act that all member states must comply with by law (EU, 2017). 
2.4.5 Option 3 
 
The 2005 ‘Impact Assessment Reforming Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyrights 
and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services’ followed right after the 
Recommendation to evaluate the steps for going forward (Moscoso, 2011 p.652-53).  Through 
this process, it was decided that the national CMOs would have to adopt and promote two main 
practices:  
1) to compete on repertoire (attracting foreign artists) 
2) to issue pan-european licenses regardless of the user’s country of origin 
 
Furthermore, it would enable rights holders to choose the CMO that would license their works 
regardless of residence or nationality across the EU, have the right to be more involved in the 
licensing process by determining i.e. the territory and most importantly, have the right to 
withdraw the online rights and transfer them to another collecting agency (Moscoso, 2011). 
Essentially, the non-profit collectives would have to transform, at least for online, and compete 
on their services (quality, efficiency etc.), their repertoire and on price for service (administrative 
fees). That was a very important development that changed drastically the approach on 
traditional collective management based on reciprocal agreements.  
 
2.4.6 Arguments for competition 
 
A competitive environment would offer the rights holder the choice to abandon a CMO which is 
inefficient and whose fees may be too high and seek membership with another CMO (traditional 
or non-traditional) (Bonadio 2012, p.8). This would provide opportunities for the rights holder to 
receive higher revenue. More critics have shared the view that the limitation of anti-competitive 
practices of CMOs would generate more revenue by adopting commercial strategies (Wenqi, 
 2012 p.50) 
 Another argument against the anti-competitive practices of CMOs is with regards to the 
distribution of royalties. By having an inadequate system of data disclosure, (inaccurate or 
missing ownership information) in combination with an unclear formula for distribution of 
royalties is problematic and may lead to discrimination and unfairness to members. The practice 
of the CMOs is often to consider other factors before distributing royalties to members, such as: 
the highest earners, biggest contributors, the length of memberships and previous earnings 
(Wenqi, 2012 p.51). This is a different approach to interpret ‘distribution by analogy’, as 
described in chapter two.  
 Additionally, it would create a dynamic system where CMOs would be encouraged to 
specialize in licensing niche repertoires. (Bonadio 2012). Although the former could be 
somewhat justified strictly with regards to competition, one could claim that the latter is rather 
difficult to pursue for a small society if all they have been left with is niche artists - because all 
the major ones would have pulled their online rights out of the CMOs. Their bargaining power is 
automatically decreased and users tend to prefer blanket licenses, as discussed in chapter one.  
 
Finally, a prime example that could justify the reforms based on competition are the existing 
phenomena of mismanagement practices in the CMO world. For example, the cases of the Greek 
CMO, AEPI who withheld 41 million euros from rights holders (European Parliament, 2014), 
Spanish SGAE’s false payments (Ingham, 2015) and a different case with misappropriation of 
funds (Koch, 2014), Russian RAO’s financial fraud allegations (The Moscow Times, 2016) 
should be regarded problematic and dissatisfied rights holders should have the right to migrate to 
a foreign and more efficient CMO. It is interesting is the above incidents occurred twelve years 
after the first recommendation, which introduced competition and after the Directive 2014/26/EU 
on the collective management of copyright, on strict CMO governance and transparency. One 
could argue that for a regulation and competition to work in every member state,the national 
authorities may have to be more involved in monitoring CMO activities in the future to support 
the local artists.  
 
2.4.7 Arguments against competition 
 
Critics considered apparent disadvantages by implementing competition and the fragmentation of 
rights. These could lead to uncertain future for the less-popular individual rights holders and 
smaller CMOs. KEA for European Affairs (2006) specialized in strategic consultation within 
creative economy, copyright and cultural diversity areas, pointed out the following threats that 
competition and the fragmentation of rights would create. These are: 
 
a) Higher administrative costs for the national repertoire (CMOs-financial issue) 
b) Smaller CMOs will lose bargaining power, if they were to administer only their national 
and less profitable in the international market repertoire (CMOs - financial issue) 
c) Online services may disregard licensing small, national repertoires or pay very little for it 
(threat to reciprocity and solidarity) 
d) Local and niche artists will find it harder to participate in the global market (threat to 
cultural diversity) 
e) Likewise with Services, Societies with the most profitable repertoire would not have an 
 incentive to recruit small rights holders from other countries (threat to cultural diversity).  
f) Smaller societies which control an equally small repertoire will not be able to compete, as 
attracting high-earning, popular artists is unlikely without (smaller CMOs may become 
irrelevant) 
(KEA, 2006 p.45) 
 
Additionally, two important observations were brought to light from KEA’s report. First, 
that the multinational publishers would pull their rights out of the CMO system, to cut down 
costs and reduce the negotiating power of CMOs (KEA, 2006). From the multinational’s point of 
view, this would be justified by a situation where a CMO can abuse its monopolist position to 
their best interest. For example, PRS for Music in the UK has tens of thousands of writers who 
may contribute less than $100 a year, but they also have superstars such as Elton John, Bono, 
Coldplay who receive hundreds of millions. By having this monopoly in place, however, the best 
interest of PRS, is to treat (or at least try) to support equally all their members indiscriminately. 
Should they lose that dominant and “abusive” power, the more lucrative anglophone repertoire 
would no longer subsidise the local talent and niche genres.  
The second point was that the EC has neglected to understand the communal 
understanding of copyright with regards to solidarity and reciprocity and their benefits to society 
and the local market. They argued that: “market partitioning is a de facto reality because of 
linguistic and cultural considerations”. (KEA, 2006) The latter could be simplified with a 
logical example: a very popular Norwegian artist in the ‘danseband’ genre may find certain 
difficulties migrating from TONO to French SACEM as the language and culture is different. In 
that regard, SACEM, quite naturally, would not be aware of that artist’s popularity in Norway. 
That view is shared by Enrico Bonadio:              
“Indeed, such artists might not be able to afford to license their rights to collecting societies in 
other Member States: in this regard, language barriers and organizational difficulties could 
represent insuperable obstacles” (Bonadio, 2008 p.9) 
 
The above two points by KEA regarding the withdrawal of rights by the publishers and 
market partitioning across in the international market are respectively reflected in Roger Wallis’ 
analyses on: 
 a) the development of vertically integrated global firms, as a threat from within the CMO system 
(Wallis et.al. 1999 pp 19-21) and 
 b) the principle of universal supply (Wallis et.al. 1999 pp.15-16). 
 
For point a: The concentrating power of the multinational companies is considered ‘threat from 
within’  for CMOs. For example, both SONY and EMI were different publishers and members of 
the same national CMO. As relatively big players in the market they represent a relatively big 
proportion of the CMOs revenue and therefore sit on the board with other publishers and writers.  
When SONY acquired EMI’s catalogue, although appearing to operate as a separate entities, it 
was considered a unified company with much stronger negotiating power in the board of a CMO. 
Therefore, the ‘threat from within’ is the sense of disadvantage of CMOs whose members are 
important, profit-driven actors. Consequently, that leads to very difficult board discussions, 
especially in situations where, for example, the CMO board is to discuss strategies against big 
conglomerates in the market to the interest of all members. An example of this became evident 
with the continuous pressure over the years of the multinationals on CMOs to lobby against 
 CISAC’s rule of 10% cultural deductions (Wallis et al 1999 p. 24). Such intentions may seem 
logical, given that major companies are investors who expect profit and not in any way keen to 
artistic philanthropy. 
 
For point b: The communal understanding of copyright has been in line with the principles of 
solidarity and reciprocity, embodied within the CMO system of reciprocal agreements. Roger 
Wallis et.al (1999) supported that such system is aligned with the principle of universal supply, 
evident in public monopolies around the world (i.e the letter post, water and electricity supply). 
A simplified example of how the letter post works in Europe is that the system ensures the 
accessibility of all users to the system with a flat fee, regardless of destination. The same rate for 
the same letter would be charged from Oslo to Sandvika, and from Oslo to Trondheim. When the 
letter is sent outside the national border, an additional fee is applied. This is also apparent with 
the reciprocal agreements of the CMOs. When i.e. Kygo’s music is being broadcasted in Japan, 
revenue from that use will be sent from JASRAC to Norwegian TONO. An extra fee then is 
applied for sending that money, which would then be distributed to the rights holders -  from the 
CMO directly to the writer, or from the CMO to the publisher who would then keep a percentage 
and pass it on to the writer. Although this system indeed did not favour the international 
conglomerates, it ensured that everyone takes part in the global economy. Huge market players 
such as Universal, Sony/EMI and Warner, who are members of the CMOs as publishers are also 
profit driven investors, who saw a decrease of revenue due to fees to CMOs.   
 
2.5 Issues for CMOs in the Online World 
 
 
This paper has so far projected certain key developments to explain how CMOs and their 
operations have evolved and provided some critical considerations. This chapter will summarize 
the effects and issues these developments brought along.  
 
2.5.1 Rights withdrawal and complexity 
 
A year after the EC’s 2005 Recommendation, major multinational publishers withdrew 
their rights from the CMO system in an attempt to cut down costs from administrative fees to the 
CMOs and for other reasons, as described earlier in the paper. Consequently, there was a 
fragmentation of rights and repertoire. The fragmentation of rights is with regards to mechanical 
and performing rights. The publishers traditionally receive income from mechanical rights and 
the performing rights still remain controlled by the traditional CMOs. Once the major publishers 
have pulled out their mechanicals, the DSP would need separate agreements and separate 
negotiations  to clear all rights.  (Butler, 2016, p.17).  
 
 When the major publishers set up their own licensing agencies, there was more 
complexity for any user in the market who seeks a license with worldwide scope. In this case 
more negotiations between different entities are required. The below entities now license the 
 Anglo-American repertoire: 
 
SOLAR: for the Anglo-American repertoire of SONY/ EMI. Before EMI’s acquisition of SONY, 
it was divided in CELAS & PAECOL respectively.  
DEAL: for the Anglo-American repertoire of Universal Music 
PEDL: for the Anglo-American repertoire of Warner 
IMPEL: for the Anglo-American repertoire for Independent publishers  
 
The Anglo-American repertoire, is usually the most lucrative and hence very attractive to users. 
However, that does not cover the world repertoire, that users desire. For that purpose, and for the 
benefit of both publishers and CMOs, special licensing bodies were set up (SVP’s) whereby 
CMOs would provide the performing rights and the major publishers the mechanicals as a 
bundled product for the DSP’s. (Butler, 2016, p.17).  
 
Compared to the analogue licensing scheme, where there would be one agreement for access to 
the world repertoire, now a user requires multiple agreements from all CMOs separately; the 
major and indie publishing hubs, as well as the CMOs for the neighbouring rights (performing 
artists and producers) a study suggests (KEA, 2012 p.30). Even if a user obtained all the above 
blanket licenses separately, there would still be legal uncertainty on whether they could 
potentially infringe copyright, as they are no longer sure they have covered the whole repertoire.  
 
The fragmentation of rights is regarded as a great disadvantage for new businesses as well as 
smaller CMOs because they have greater financial obstacles to compete in the online market  
(Hilty & Nerisson, 2013 p.9). An indicative study suggests that the overall costs for licensing the 
national repertoire of five European countries including the UK, Germany, France, Austria and 
Poland (excluding the mechanical rights) are roughly estimated at €3.525.600  (Reis et al, 2014 
p.93). These financial barriers, and their potentially destructive outcomes for a market economy 
have not been unfamiliar in history. An example comes from Michael Heller, in his book 
Gridlock Economy. In the Middle Ages, the long river Rhine in Germany was very important 
and valuable for European trading but local aristocrats and robber barons decided to set up toll 
booths along the route of the river, forcing traders to pay customs and taxes along their journey. 
All the different costs, taxes and negotiations made trading so impractical and expensive that the 
market collapsed; traders had no longer the incentive to ship their goods and sail on the river. 
(Heller, 2010 p.3). Likewise, a start-up DSP or small company who would like to set up a service 
that specializes and promotes, for example, European folk music, would be disincentivized to do 
so, as these kinds of DSP’s do not have the same capacity to hire professionals (lawyers, 
negotiators) who will make sure all the required licenses have been obtained to use music 
legally. It is therefore a much more cumbersome and expensive practice for them, than for a 
multinational company. Moscoso (2011, p.654) argued that in such commercial environment, the 
evolution of business ideas and disintermediated concepts to the benefit of the niche repertoires, 
as romanticized by Chris Anderson in his book ‘The Long Tail’, can not be pursued. A central 
theme of Anderson’s long tail theory argued that digitalization would essentially decrease the 
value gap between hit songs and niche songs in terms of revenue and diversity of repertoire. It is 
seems difficult to agree with this theory (Anderson, 2006).  
 
On the EU level, cultural diversity and “freedom” of the rights holders to participate in the 
 market have also been in the agenda for the European Commission when they instigated the 
Directive of 2014. It was an attempt to cover both cultural and single market policies.  Although 
GESAC welcomed the Directive of 2014 as part of their willingness to find solutions towards 
harmonizing CMO operations, they expressed their dissatisfaction on the lack of focus on 
cultural diversity: 
 
“(...) GESAC regrets however that the opportunities to guarantee cultural diversity were not 
taken as necessary, since it is uncertain whether all repertoires will be offered by digital services 
on a pan-European basis.” (GESAC 2014) 
 
http://www.authorsocieties.eu/mediaroom/145/33/GESAC-welcomes-the-adoption-of-the-
Collective-Rights-Management-Directive-by-the-European-Parliament 
 
 
Regarding the smaller CMOs, the economic rationale behind their operations and their 
possibility to function even by controlling small domestic repertoires, was by exploiting 
economies of scale and reducing their administrative costs. (Handke and Towse, 2008 p.3). This 
is no longer the case.  A 2009 study by ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and 
Foreign Policy) for the European Parliament predicted this issue and stated that: 
 
“...it seems reasonable to conclude that at least the Anglo-American repertoire represents a very 
important revenue source for the European collecting societies, whether these are of a large, 
medium or small size. Deprived of such repertoires, the profitability of medium-sized and small 
collecting societies, in particular, could be endangered, undermining their ability to cater for the 
interests of their members”. (ELIAMEP, 2009 p.97) 
 
It is clear that by losing the most lucrative repertoire, smaller CMOs will not appeal DSP’s, who 
may disregard their domestic repertoires, and seek the “much-needed” Anglo-American 
repertoire to develop services that will promote and establish their businesses. In many ways, this 
situation indicates that the principles of reciprocity, solidarity as well as cultural diversity are 
fading away. 
 
   
Overall, the negative impact of this complexity shoots both ways - all the above factors for both 
DSP’s and small CMOs are highly relevant to the broader context of a flourishing online market, 
where big and small actors get a chance to participate in.  
 
 
2.5.2 Big data: non efficient data processing 
 
Voices predicted long time ago that as technology and the media would create opportunities to 
consume more music, the vast dissemination of that musical content could make the collection 
and distribution of money from online use very difficult (Frith, 2004 p.174).  
 
The quality of data in terms of having correct ownership information about songs and their rights 
 holders is not a new type of problem area for the CMOs as it also existed when internet was in its 
infancy. Wallis (2001) considered that the CMOs were facing a challenge concerning the quality 
of different kinds of data that is fed to their systems and would need correct and up-to-date 
databases, efficient transaction processing systems and good collection and distribution routines 
locally and internationally in collaboration with their sister societies. There have been certain 
inefficient and costly practices in that regard. A CMO in country A would always have to re-
register a new song coming from country B in the analogue world. Given that they did not share 
the same database, there were additional risks that data could be amended without further notice, 
affecting the correct original ownership matrix of a musical work. The CMOs would have to find 
a way to process that data efficiently in the digital world and ensure that they hold the correct 
information about rights holders (Wallis, 2001 p.19).  
The first example of a joint database system for CMOs in Europe has been Norddoc, 
where information about members and copyright registrations of musical works from Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland would be linked together (Wallis, 2001). On a global 
scale, the International Music Joint Venture (IMJV) would provide a shared works database 
between Buma (Holland), PRS for Music (UK), Ascap (USA) and Socan (Canada) in year 2000, 
but the project was dissolved in late 2001 (Wallis 2001). As the industry developed and the 
consumption of music online grew significantly, the music industry (CMOs, publishers, record 
labels and technological companies) attempted to revive the idea of a central authoritative source 
for copyright information. The Global Repertoire Database aimed to deliver holistic data 
solutions for the music industry and would include copyright information about rights holders 
and counterclaim module to settle disputes (Cooke, 2015 p. 70). There are many speculations as 
to why that project did not deliver at a crucial phase in the music industry. Klementina Milosic 
(2015) wrote in Berklee’s Music Business Journal that some of the reasons were financial (too 
expensive) and political (in terms of who would control the GRD). 
 
Nonetheless, in the midst of a digital Renaissance, music is consumed more than ever as IFPI 
(2016) reported, and the problem of efficient data processing and music identification persists to 
exist. Streaming services today have the ability to provide usage reports back to the CMOs but 
they usually come in a format that is incompatible with their existing national databases 
(Owsinski, 2016). Matching a song with the information from usage reports is a crucial part for 
verifying rights holders and making revenues from that usage distributable. Thus, where data is 
flawed or incomplete, human intervention is inevitably needed to manually process that data.  
In summary, the extreme number of usage reports from streaming (as discussed earlier), 
which, combined with the possibilities of having inaccurate information, makes distribution of 
revenue highly inefficient and drives the licensing and operating costs for CMOs up. One could 
say that asymmetry between databases and ownership information make it infeasible for CMOs 
to process all of the usage reports, even when using IT systems and automation, as these can not 
cope with poor quality data. As a result, a lot of lines of usages may be left unprocessed and 
revenue from high value works may not distributed until the rights holders are identified 
manually.  
 
 2.5.3 Slow speed  
 
Another problematic area connected to data, is the slow speed of revenue distribution, known for 
a long time as a disadvantage in the CMO system of remuneration according to Hutchinson, (as 
cited in Holden, 1999). The official Journal of the European Union provides the contents of the 
EU Directive of 2014 which was transposed into national law in April 2016. Here it states that 
the distribution should be sent out: 
“...no later than nine months from the end 
of the financial year in which the rights revenue was collected, 
unless objective reasons relating in particular to reporting by 
users, identification of rights, rightholders or matching of 
information on works and other subject-matter with right 
holders prevent the collective management organisation or, 
where applicable, its members from meeting that deadline”.  
 
                (The Official Journal of The European Union, 2014) 
 
In practice, once monies are collected by a national CMO, there is a nine-month deadline to pay 
it out to members; however, this may be extended in situations where the national CMO is not 
able to identify the correct rights holder (as seen above, a likely scenario).  
Furthermore, this deadline may be extended even longer, when revenue has been 
collected by a foreign CMO (whose deadline is also nine months for sending it to the rights 
holder’s national CMO). Should the foreign CMO extend due to data processing difficulties, then 
the result is that the rights holder may receive the revenue after several years. This is a big issue 
for rights holders whose music is being consumed worldwide via the internet. Payment delays 
may lead to dissatisfaction from rights holders, who may have invested a lot of money and time 
for that remuneration. This is ultimately an issue for all CMOs, as dissatisfied rights holders may 
have an incentive to abandon their membership (as it happened with major publishers) and turn 
to private companies.  
 
 
2.5.4 New, non-traditional entrants 
 
Before the fragmentation of rights and the legislative reforms to promote competition in the EU, 
there was no other legal way for a creator to receive remuneration than by assigning those rights 
to the national CMO. This is no longer the case, as private companies have emerged in the 
industry. They operate as aggregators of repertoire and collective agencies for online revenue 
streams.  
 
Kobalt Music, for instance (traditionally a publisher), use the innovative Kore technology and 
are able to track down usage from any website or digital service where a song has been used and 
can monetize even small usages from streaming and transfer micro-payments to their artists. 
Detailed quantitative data regarding usage and payments is then laid out in a digital dashboard, 
which is available almost instantly for their artists via a modern and user-friendly mobile app 
 (Gray, 2015). Kobalt and, similarly, Global Music Rights (not a publisher) have attracted many 
high-profile artists and now collect royalties from streaming music directly from the DSP’s. 
Their repertoires include: 
 
GMR: Drake, John Lennon, Ira Gershwin, Bruno Mars, Jon Bon Jovi, Bryan Adams, Billy Idol 
and thousands more. (GMR, 2017) 
Kobalt Music: Bob Dylan, Max Martin, Bob Marley, Paul Mc Cartney, the Disney catalogue and 
thousands more. (Kobalt 2017) 
 
In the grand scheme of issues for CMOs, this one may also be considered a major consequence. 
Because CMOs now also compete with private tech companies who “cherry-pick” high earning 
artists that once used to be represented by CMOs; That is one part of the issue. The second part is 
the direction it has taken with regards to Kobalt’s acquisition of the American Music Rights 
Association (AMRA) which is also a CISAC member (Clark, 2015). Any writer who assigns 
mechanical and performing rights with AMRA, essentially assigns it to Kobalt, who receive 
100% of the earnings and become de-facto a CMO. Could this pave the way for traditional 
CMOs obsolescence, or is it an indication that aggregation of rights might displace the traditional 
structures of CMOs? 
 3. Methodology 
 
This study seeks to explore a complex topic that involves different actors, such as non-profit 
CMOs, commercial companies, national governments etc. each with their own agendas, policies 
and strategies. After choosing the topic of the thesis and formulating the problem hypothesis, the 
indications from related theory was that the opinions are in the eyes of the beholder. On the other 
hand, it was considered very useful to look at the problem through the eyes of some specific 
beholders with specific tasks in the industry. This part of the chapter explains how qualitative 
interviews, supported by the necessary theoretical material was the most suitable methodology 
for the topic.  
 
3.1 Methodology and interviews  
 
A qualitative method has been chosen because the paper seeks findings that can not be obtained 
by using statistics and numerical data as opposed to a quantitative approach (Strauss and Corbin 
1990, p.17).  
 Given the lack of research in the area of CMOs, the objective of this thesis has been to 
understand what certain actors from within the ‘system’ think about the addressed problems. To 
do so, qualitative interviews provide in-depth understanding when dealing with relatively broad 
topics, and allow interviewees to use their own words; even elaborate on a the addressed problem 
(Corbin and Morse 2003). The purpose of a qualitative interview is therefore: 
 
“To gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with the intention of interpreting the 
meaning of the described phenomena” (Kvale, 1983). 
 
The interviews conducted for this paper have been in a semi-structured form. A list of questions 
on certain topics was pre-selected but there was certain flexibility in how and when these 
questions were to be put during the interview (Edwards and Holland, 2013 p.29). This is 
important when seeking as much detail as possible. On the other hand, structured interviews 
provide certain limitations and are preferred in form of case studies (questionnaires, yes or no 
answers etc).  
 
 
Travers (2001) and Kvale (1994) state that qualitative research method tends to be criticized 
about its legitimacy - Many authors have argued that qualitative research tends to be more of a 
philosophical approach, that is not objective, does not address scientific issues, provides results 
that can not be measured etc. On the contrary, a quantitative approach is viewed more 
scientifically accurate, hence objective and with “tangible” results. In that regard, Kvale (1994, 
p.169) is critical on such views, and argues that: 
 
a) too much time in the academia is spent on discussing whether qualitative interview 
 research is legitimate or not (high defense expenditure), instead of using those resources 
to improve the quality of the research as well as its thoroughness and creativity. 
b) authors who argue against the legitimacy of qualitative interviews with regards to, i.e 
objectivity or validity, do not take into account their ambiguous concepts 
c) at the end, the real value of a qualitative research is established by its contribution to new 
knowledge rather than defending arguments on its legitimacy 
 
 
 
According to Weiss (1994, p.9-11), there are certain research aims that make qualitative 
interview studies a beneficial method of choice. The below reflect the aims of this thesis:  
 
-developing detailed and holistic descriptions. 
 Seeking full reports on ‘how’ and ‘why’ events took place from people who were involved in an 
event. For example, my interviewees took part in the decision making of policies/agreements that 
this paper addresses ‘problematic’ or causes for certain issues. By asking ‘why’ or ‘how’ those 
developments came to be, and comparing views of more than one informant, reports are 
integrated in a way that conclusions are more clear, as to whether i.e. a system works or fails to 
work.   
  
-integrating multiple perspectives  
Combining the views of people with different professional tasks. This thesis includes four 
interviews of four people with different leading roles. Their different answers are different pieces 
of the same puzzle that the researcher must build, by identifying differences or similarities.  
 
-describing processes 
there is no doubt that very few people are aware or understand the context of copyright systems 
that this thesis brings to light. An insight of specific processes straight from the source for i.e. the 
system of remuneration for creators, could only be possible through interviews (or by 
participating/observing - that has not been possible for this research as the technical system 
processes of CMOs are not publicly available and access is very limited) 
 
-learning how events are interpreted:  
When the researcher seeks to understand the reaction of other actors about a specific event. This 
reflects many aspects in this thesis, for example, the reaction of publishers and CMOs when 
competition was imposed by the EU. Here the event is already known, but the insight of a person 
who saw the responses of both parties is extremely valuable towards identifying if the same 
event has been interpreted differently.  
 
-identifying variables and framing hypotheses for quantitative research  
A problem usually needs to be identified and named before testing it with precise numbers. 
Quantitative researches need the variables to be measured and hypotheses to be tested; this study 
certainly serves as a problem identifier, as mentioned in the introduction of the paper.  
 
 3.2 Process and issues in interviews 
 
 
These are several issues that an interviewer must take into consideration in advance.  
 
 
3.2.1 confidentiality 
 
The interviewer must guarantee the respondents confidentiality. It is a commitment that the 
respondent will not be damaged because of his or her participation in the interview. (Robert S. 
Weiss, 1994 p. 131). That is why all informants have been asked before the interview if they 
consent to being interviewed and recorded throughout the process.  
3.2.2 Matching interviewer to the respondent 
 
This issue could also be formulated into a question, such as: ‘to what extent is it necessary for 
the interviewer to be an insider in the respondent’s world in order to be effective’? Studies have 
shown that the respondent tends to use observable characteristics to find common ground with 
the interviewer and their judgment in that regard: “could affect the opinions and attitudes they 
voice” (Robert S. Weiss, 1994 p. 137). In order to get the best possible answers and reduce the 
chances of being turned down, I decided in advance that the interviews should be conducted 
while making myself familiar with their work, outside academia. As a short-term employee at 
PRS for Music, I was considered a “colleague” and entered their world. I was therefore in a 
much better position to get important information that would otherwise be more difficult to 
obtain. From the interview analyses and the full transcripts, it is clear that my informants made 
themselves comfortable and vocal when I addressed certain topics. They took the necessary time 
to give long, detailed and relevant answers.  Some of them also felt like giving very honest and 
straight-forward answers without having the need to “sugarcoat” anything. In that sense, making 
myself “one of them” has been of crucial importance towards obtaining that kind of information.  
 
3.2.2 Interview with acclaimed professionals 
 
When interviewing individuals who have been quite successful in their professional career it is 
not unusual that interviewers tend to make reference to their own achievements. This can happen 
subconsciously when the respondent is a person they respect or admire. That tendency, although 
slightly prevailing during the interviews, must be avoided should the interviewer seek to 
establish a good interviewing partnership (Weiss, 1994 p. 138-139). 
 
 
 3.3 The informants 
 
The chosen interviewees are distinguished professionals with very senior roles in collective 
management. As Directors of powerful CMOs (PRS and MCPS) they have been involved in 
crucial developments and with their decision-making have contributed to shaping the 
international music industry and the future of the CMOs. Therefore, they are also most fit to 
answer, given that they all work for a powerful player in the International market (PRS/MCPS) 
Due to their different roles and expertise they approached the interview questions/topics from 
different perspectives. The interviews are only four - one could argue that there could be more 
informants from the music industry. The quality of the findings here should compensate for the 
lack of a greater number of interviews, which is usually the case in many researches that touch 
upon complex topics.  
 
 
1. Graham Davies: Director of Digital & Strategy at PRS (UK’s Performing Right Society). 
He has worked towards finding innovative solutions for PRS and other collecting 
societies in the digital age. With over 12 years of experience as a Director in different 
departments at PRS, he has seen the industry and traditional collective management 
change dramatically. He has an excellent understanding of how collecting societies can 
work in a globalized market. He is passionate about music and he is himself a pianist.  
 
2. Jane Dyball: Director of MCPS (UK’s Mechanical Rights Society) and former SVP 
Warner Chappell (International and Legal Business Affairs).  Dyball has +30 year old 
experience in the music business. She became a very influential person in the music 
industry while working for Warner/Chappell Music Publishing. She was the person who 
initiated and executed the pan-European Online licensing for Radiohead’s famous “In 
Rainbows” album in 2007. An experiment where people would get the chance to 
download the band’s album on a ‘pay whatever you want’ basis. That result was one of 
the first clear evidences that compared to physical sales,  online licensing could bring in a 
lot more revenue directly from the fans. She is a person that understands very well how 
the music market functions and has been involved in all major CMO-related 
developments as a board member, speaker and panelist. 
 
3. Ben McEwen: Commercial Director at International Copyright Enterprise (ICE) and 
Head of Online at PRS for Music. McEwen has been characterized as an “ace licensor” 
by Will Page (Director of Economics, Spotify & former Head of Finance at PRS for 
Music).  
 
4. Bruce Dickinson: Head of Risk and Assurance at PRS for Music. He has an eighteen year 
old experience with leading roles in collective management and known for his 
exceptional knowledge of the international music industry and the CMO network.  
3.4 The interview process 
 
 The first step was to send out an email with a description of my Master Thesis topic and why I 
thought each of these particular employees would be fit for the interview.   
 
All interviews except with Ben McEwen (by phone) have been conducted face to face, but they 
were all very different: 
Jane Dyball expected me to be at her office on the top floor of PRS’ prestigious building 
overlooking King’s Cross station in central London.  After she reviewed the topic of my thesis, 
the request for an interview was accepted through my team manager at the Member Services 
Department and the appointment was booked.The setting for this interview could be described as 
highly exclusive and the atmosphere rather “chic”. The combination of these created something 
very welcoming.The duration of the interview was 30 minutes.  
Graham Davies, although based in the same PRS building, preferred to welcome me at 
the cafeteria himself, bought me a tea and sat in front of me at a small table a bit far from the 
other employees. Although he is also a very senior person, director and board member, his 
approach was more welcoming and the atmosphere less corporate. That was perhaps due to his 
understanding of my post-graduate student status and genuine interest in the topic that I brought 
for discussion. The interview lasted 1 hour and 6 minutes.  
Bruce Dickinson, came to meet me at the floor of PRS’ Streatham premises (the second 
office, for mainly members services). His approach was more than welcoming - he was also 
willing to “level down” in order to answer questions truthfully and straight forward without 
thinking twice. We had already booked a meeting room for 30 minutes, but the interview lasted 
43 minutes.  
Ben McEwen was contacted by phone. From the beginning he appeared to be very 
informative with what appeared to be a very structured line of thought. He spoke much faster 
than the other interviewees but stayed relevant to the addressed questions .The interview lasted 
35 minutes.  
   
 
3.5 Analyzing the interviews 
 
The first step for analyzing the interviews was to transcribe them from audio into text, and begin 
the process of analysing and evaluating the data. Miles and Huberman support that the more 
understanding the researcher has developed during the process of collecting data, the more 
certain they can be about its adequacy. (Miles and Huberman, 1984 p.49). In that sense, each 
interview was transcribed right after its collection and was reviewed separately.  
 
After all interviews were collected and transcribed, a four-stage framework has been adapted as 
per Alan Bryman’s (2001) four stages of analysis. 
 
-Stage one 
Reading through the transcripts to identify when responses that focus on a certain theme occur. 
For example, ‘competition and CMOs’ or ‘data processing challenges’, have been identified as 
concepts and sorted thematically to find possible links between the different responses.  
 
 -Stage two 
Writing notes, marking and highlighting key-words on the identified themes from stage one. For 
example, when the theme is ‘competition’ one respondent might characterize it as ‘very good’ 
and another ‘very bad’. These are the kinds of keywords that have been marked to evaluate and 
compare findings.  
 
-Stage three 
Reviewing the text and grouping occurrences of the same theme. This is helpful towards 
eliminating repetition and indexing the themes more thoroughly.  
 
Stage four: 
Identifying the connections between the responses and the supporting theory. The relation of the 
two is interpreted and where possible, matched with the research questions. 
 4. Interview responses 
 
The interview questions were chosen after reading relevant theoretical sources about problem 
areas for CMOs. Since the interviewees had different area of expertise, the questions differed but 
fell upon the same topics. These were coded into different themes as per below:  
 
-Fragmentation of rights  
 
-Competition and CMOs 
 
-Data processing (including database systems, identification processes etc.)  
 
-Other :New entrants and Future scenarios 
 
It is important to note that some new topics brought up during the interviews were disregarded 
from the analysis as the data had to be narrowed down to reflect the initial hypothesis and 
research questions. The full transcripts of the interviews in detail can be found in the appendix.  
 
 
4.1 Topic 1: Fragmentation of rights 
 
Dickinson started off saying that before online music and fragmentation, the blanket licensing 
worked perfectly well: 
 
“ It was fine when everything was limited to one country. So, when broadcasting didn’t spill over 
borders and before internet messed everything up. We were perfectly well. The PRS could license 
the BBC, SACEM could license TV2 and we could license hairdressers in London and SACEM 
could license coffee shops in Paris and so on. I think that worked perfectly well and the idea of 
“OK,  we pay your writers, you pay our writers” was a perfectly sensible good system.” 
 
He then mentioned that licensing is linked with administration and distribution of the rights 
included in the license. By pulling their repertoire, major publishers thought they would solve 
these issues but have made things more problematic: 
 
“When it started off, about 15 years ago, I think a lot of the publishers thought: “we can do this 
ourselves better and cheaper” But I think they realized very quickly that they couldn’t, which is 
why essentially, we do all the work. They just give us the rights and we get to take a small 
amount of money for it. But I think that Universal and SONY said that they could not do this on 
their own at the moment, because the CMOs have 100years experience in doing this. But they 
don’t have the experience of doing that level of detail. They can do the licensing, no problem! 
They are quite good at that. But the administration and the distribution side of it is different. But 
 it has, and will become more problematic”. 
 
 
He believed that the writer’s taking control over their rights for individual licensing becomes 
worse when they license bits of rights for different purposes: 
 
“(...) If you are a writer and you join a society, generally if you join PRS you give us all your 
performing rights for all ‘usages’ for all countries. You have always been allowed to pick and 
choose the countries, for example, having a membership with the PRS but excluding USA and let 
ASCAP take care of that part, or STIM for Sweden. So, you join STIM for Sweden and PRS for 
the rest of the world. Now..more and more you can say: I am giving you my rights but my online 
rights are going to another body, maybe Universal, maybe a friend of yours who can negotiate 
with Spotify. So you can say that your broadcasting rights are going there and your live rights go 
here and the picture gets much more complicated. If it is only digital or online it is maybe not so 
bad, because that is already very fragmented. But I think if you decide that your broadcasting 
rights stay with PRS but my cinema rights will go with SACEM. 
 
He summed it up with a practical example: 
“if GEMA collects money for you, they have to think: Right! We’ve got $100. From that $25 is 
for broadcasting so that goes to the PRS, $5 is for cinema, so that needs to go to SACEM, 
instead of saying: “OK, right, It’s all for him and it all goes to PRS”. So this will make things 
much much more complicated”. 
 
Dyball approached the topic from a different perspective. She believed that the publishers have 
helped the market by pulling out their rights and licensing them directly to services: 
 
“(...) I think that the publishers taking matters into their own hand really helped the market. Now 
there is quite a bit of criticism because the DSPs go: Oh my god, I have to go to all these people, 
it would be so much easier going to once place and getting once license. They do have to go 
around and get it and then they complained about it but what they forget was what it was like 
before, where you could not get any engagement”. 
 
She believed that focus should rather be put on ways which can improve the efficiency of 
CMO´s in a fragmented environment: 
 
“I think the challenges are firstly to make collective management more efficient and more cost 
effective. CMOs provide a valuable function and an essential function probably because they 
unite… you know, they aggregate repertoire and then they license it especially for small uses 
that you can't license. It's just not cost effective to license individually. So, it's a very expensive 
way of doing it, there is a lot of room for saving money. And that seems to be going up rather 
than down! I think the cost of CMOs across Europe is a bit over 1 billion euros per year. That is 
how much they cost. So, that is a lot of money for a lot of repetition. Even if you take 25% out of 
that, that is money from revenue streams. So there is a challenge to cut cost, especially while the 
amount of effort is increasing”. 
 
McEwen’s view was similar to Dickinson’s with regards to the challenges caused by 
 fragmentation but he was optimistic: 
 
“(...)With online we have had specific challenges because copyright as you know is territorial in 
a way that it's developed and obviously that brings big challenges when you go into a multi-
territorial or global environment in which the industry is developing solutions for.. You know, I 
am generally reasonably optimistic about the future”. 
 
Davies also acknowledged the problem of fragmentation and touched upon Dickinson’s view of 
the individual control over licensing being the cause of complexity. Similarly with Dyball’s view 
he did not stress any serious concerns on the topic and focused on working towards a building a 
strategy that would provide solutions based on the new rules: 
 
“I would say the key difference between the Santiago agreement with the option 3 from 
recommendation from the European Commission and the rights holders was to exercise their 
direct control over the pricing and licensing of their rights on a multi territorial basis and not 
leaving those rights with the CMOs. And that is part of what we have been looking at. We have 
bundles of rights being licensed and priced separately. That is a very very different world to how 
the societies and the network have been running before. And it has given rights to huge amounts 
of complexity”. 
 
4.2 Topic 2: Competition and CMOs 
 
Dickinson believed that competition generally does not work well with collective management of 
copyright and pointed out the difference when comparing music with tangible products: 
 
“I don’t think it does, personally, I think this is where the European Commission has 
misunderstood what we do. Competition works very well on mobile phones and TVs, I think, 
brilliantly! I do not think that it works in this field because if this phone is too expensive or not 
very good you can go to Samsung or (not Nokia now.. Motorola or Windows phone or whatever). 
You can buy something else which may be cheaper or better or both! But I think in the world of 
rights..only you own your rights! Or, OK, and PRS”. 
 
He elaborated on the special nature of a musical work, and the difficulty to compete on price, 
between different licenses offered for the same work : 
 
“I suppose because it is unique in that way, I don’t think it can work that you could have lots of 
different people selling your thing. If you said: Right, I am a songwriter, I’ve written 100 songs 
and they are all licensed by Gema, Sacem, Stim, PRS, ASCAP etc. Everyone, everywhere around 
the world. I think again you start to get into the who is doing it cheapest. Because then, I only 
want to pay for the cheapest one. So if you said: Right Bruce, this is ten pounds from me for his 
songs I am going to go for the one that charges one pound! Because that is how it will work. 
Otherwise, there is no point in being in ten different societies”. 
 
He then mentioned that competition generally puts creators in a difficult position with regards to 
 receiving their compensation: 
 
“(...) you lose out because you have written the songs but you are getting very little money for 
them and this is where I think, you know.. if Apple finds out nobody is buying their things, they 
will reduce the price, or they will try to make them better.. or make something else. But you as a 
songwriter you don’t have that ability. So I think it does not work in a competitive environment.  
But .. it has to, because now this is the way the market works”. 
 
On top of that, he added that CMOs are having difficulties agreeing on the price for online 
licensing.  Competing on price does not guarantee support for the economic value of music: 
 
“The difficulty now is, as we have rapidly moved from (20 years ago no one knew what the 
internet was, really!) now, since things have become more globalized it has become much more 
complex. In many ways it should have made it much easier in as much as PRS should be able to 
go to Apple or Spotify and say: “We’ll license you for the whole world”. The difficulty is that if 
we say “we are gonna do it for 10%”, someone else will do it at 9% and someone else at 8%. So 
I think especially in Europe at the moment, we are in a real difficulty of: Do we all decide we all 
charge 8%? (In which case we have fixed the price). Or do we say: “charge whatever you 
want?” And whoever charges the lowest, the man who charges 1% wins. but the writers don’t 
get anything! So it’s a really difficult balance I think between charging the right amount, not 
collaborating to fix a price, and yet still getting a decent value for everybody”. 
 
From Dyball’s perspective competition is good, in commercial terms and boosts service 
efficiency: 
 
“I think fundamentally competition is good. It means that people have to be as good as they can 
be to attract business. (...) I think that it speeds things up, it makes it easier, you can cut a deal.. I 
believe in the exclusive nature of rights. So I don't believe that every CMO should be able to 
license everybody's repertoire for example. Because then you would have societies undercutting 
each other. But I believe that if I own rights, it is good for me if I have got a choice of which 
society I am going to let license my rights. I think deals get done much more quickly when the 
people that own the rights are able to drive the deal terms. You know, it's much easier if you are 
able to negotiate yourself”. 
When she was asked to give her opinion on the reasons behind the failure of collaborative 
solutions (Santiago and Barcelona Agreements) to deal with online licensing she mentioned that 
it was taking too long for CMOs to decide how to act: 
 
“I was around in the Santiago agreement and Barcelona agreement at that time and there was a 
3rd agreement which was an online M.O.U (Memorandum of Understanding) which would have 
been a very collaborative approach to digital licensing. We spent 7 years negotiating that. I 
mean.. 7 years! And after a while (I was a publisher then) I think some of the CMOs may have 
been in a bit of denial about the digital market. You know, it is impossible to imagine a world 
where it is acceptable to spend 7 years discussing anything really”. 
 
She elaborated by saying that the CMOs feared of taking decisions at an important phase in the 
music industry and this would have a negative impact on digital commerce: 
  
“It is no wonder that the level of frustration was so high that you just think.. right.. we can't 
afford to not do anything. We can't afford just to postpone this and leave it for tomorrow again 
and again. But we had to do something about it and at that time I was working for a publishing 
company and there was no option but to say: This is a business I want to engage in and if the 
societies system is not going to engage in there for me, then I am going to engage. You know, 
these digital services they are not all bad people. You know, there was a lot of fear in digital 
services and a fear of engaging or agreeing rates which you might later regret. (...) And if you 
are a commercial organization then you have to make deals! You just have to make deals 
otherwise you can't carry on”. 
 
Finally she believed that competition worked positively towards making CMOs more active in 
making commercial deals: 
 
“What was problematic back then was that if you were a CMO you didn’t have to make deals. 
Not quite so much. You know, you've got enough business to not make deals.. So the societies 
have changed now. They have become a much more embraced concept of making a deal but back 
then there was a real fear that if you did a deal you would later regret it cause you charged the 
wrong amount and nobody knew what the right amount was” 
 
Mc Ewen’s general view on ‘competition vs collaboration’ was different than the rest of the 
interviewees, he suggested that inevitably a CMO will need both elements to thrive in the 
market: 
 
“What is interesting is that the past to the future is with a combination of collaboration and 
competition. I know those two things are sort of naturally and diametrically opposed but actually 
i think increasingly we are working in an environment where we are... partners and 
collaborators in various projects that we might work on, like the GRD.  Here are lots of 
examples with projects that we work on together and other areas that we license and work 
together and other areas where we actively compete. I certainly do not think it is one or the 
other”. 
 
Regarding collaboration for digital solutions in the likes of the Santiago agreement he mentioned 
that it had certain disadvantages and would not increase the necessary efficiency to deal with 
digitalization: 
 
“I think the danger of a pure sort of 'collaboration share strategy without the competitive 
'impetus' is that nothing much changes. You still have all the same players doing things in the 
same way and that is definitely not the solution. Partly because it doesn't deliver you the kind of 
systems and specialization that you need to deal in this environment. You need fewer places that 
are really up to the technological challenge and providing that aggregation and I think you get 
there through competition”. 
 
He then gave an example of competition with elements of collaboration, such as the licensing 
hubs: 
 
 “If you look at PRS' strategy it is to partner with like-minded societies to develop a hub that will 
be the competitive force in the market and will involve fewer places to go to get the rights. So, I 
think this is an example that combines collaboration and competition. I definitely don't think it's 
a ‘neither-or’. You need to blend these two things to make it work”. 
 
Davies did not touch upon any certain concerns with competition and believed that option 3 from 
the 2005 Recommendation was the only option that would protect the value of copyright in the 
online world:  
 
“(...)PRS’ response to that was to say that not all societies responded in favour of option 3. We 
did. And we said: any other option is going to de-value copyright. So, competition for rights is a 
better way to safeguard the value of copyright. And we went out saying: this is our strategy and 
our solutions, not just for us but for the industry about how we can make this work”. 
 
When asked about his opinion regarding collaborative vs competitive solutions to online 
licensing, he reflected on Dyball’s view. Although CMOs would collaborate, the online services, 
by having no physical borders, would be able to choose the society that would offer the cheapest 
online license: 
 
“The reason we did not support that is because you go to SGAE and they say: we'll do it for 
10cents, and then go to SABAM and they say: hold on, we can do it for 9! So the price can go 
down and that means that the price of the copyright goes down. So now what you are able to do 
is: you are not able to get the blanket license on a pan-european basis but you can get PRS's 
repertoire licensed on a Pan-European basis”. 
 
4.3 Topic 3: Data processing 
 
Dyball believed that the biggest challenges for CMOs is to standardize data as well as rules and 
protocols on how that data is processed between collective societies: 
 
“We have more lines of revenue to process, you need more powerful processes in order to 
process data and get through that level of information in order to distribute it…there has to be 
more automation and more agreement between societies as to protocols and ways of invoicing”. 
 
Regarding the agreements and protocols between CMOs she mentioned that each country may 
handle data differently in different areas (i.e registration or invoicing). This is problematic and 
makes handling data for distribution, identification of rights holders, and accurate ownership 
information less efficient. She believed that CMOs must get together and agree on common 
processes to their mutual benefit:  
 
“There is no reason for a process in the UK to be different from a process in Germany. It is no 
longer acceptable, I think, for a British society to say: But this is how the market operates in 
Britain. I am not using a real example, but in the UK you might be invoicing a digital service 
quarterly, in Sweden you might be invoicing them monthly, in Holland you might do that 
 manually. Here, I am specifically talking about protocols that are different from country to 
country. For example, if 3 people write a song, you can't say 1/3 and 1/3, you have to say 33%. 
So everybody registers their claim for their song writer for 33.34%. If you register a creator with 
33.34% you get to over 100%. That then puts the song into dispute. So, you have to think about 
those protocols to save time and money. Everyone has to agree on a protocol around data to 
make it easier to process data. So, there is lots of protocols that have not been agreed about how 
companies invoice or how copyright information is registered. If I register a Radiohead song I 
might register it under the name of Thom Yorke someone else might register it under the name of 
Thomas York, somebody might spell it as ‘Tom’ ”. 
 
 
Finally, Dyball believed that back office processes (standardizing copyright data) must become 
more unified and this step is a lot more important than the ‘front office’ operations (negotiating 
licensing deals). 
 
“I think there is a distinction between the back office and the front office. So Delta is the back 
office, which is about engines and processing. Zeta is the hub for the front office which is about 
negotiating. So, I think there is a much more crucial role for Delta. I think there is a real market 
need to merge back offices and databases because it is any like pieces of machinery.The more 
you push through the machinery the cheaper it should be and the most cost effective. For 'front 
office licensing', I am not so convinced about it because I don't like the idea of delegating 
licensing I think it does not work very much. Delegating licensing works for mechanical if you 
are licensing a record company because there is no negotiation. There is one once every ten 
years or there is an argument once every ten years about how much the record company is going 
to pay for mechanical rights. So it works for licensing broadcasters but not for online because 
you've got to have negotiations. 
 
Dickinson believed that the reasons behind the criticism on the efficiency of CMOs is related to 
their long background and analogue practices. He hoped that the digital leap will provide 
opportunities to become as efficient as a commercial company, since the technological solutions 
exist: 
 
“The problem here is that we started doing this 100 years ago. And..we are still doing it the 
same way we did it 100 years ago.. more or less. We are getting more from there, then dividing it 
to 10 people and then we pay it out. And that is not wrong, but there must be a quicker and more 
efficient way of doing it. This is where I think the online world can hopefully teach the rest of us 
a lot. If you are Spotify or Apple or whatever it is very easy to know who has paid for your songs, 
how many seconds your song is (if that is relevant), how long they have been listening etc. 
Spotify can divide up their money accurately and immediately, to the second. We have to get long 
logs from the BBC, from ITV, Channel 4 and from 300 other broadcasters in Britain and run 
them through some ancient cranky computer to come out with the number of seconds or minutes 
and then break that down by song and then by writers..” 
 
His view on a suggested ‘reset and rebuild’ strategy to deal with data more efficiently, was that it 
would be ideal, but not possible: 
 
 If we were starting this today, it would be much easier. But I think the perfect solution would be 
to say: PRS is gonna stop doing what is doing for 2 years and rebuild everything from zero. Then 
that would be possible, or it would be much easier to do it that way. But you can’t stop! Do you 
see what I mean? If we stop, nobody gets anything for 2 years and then it is more difficult to start 
up again. But for example, IMRO, the Irish society are quite new (not more than 20 years more 
or less). They do the same operation like us but with very very few people because they are a bit 
more modern and they can do things more quickly. Whereas we have got, as you have seen, a 
membership department of 80 people and operations department of 50-70 people, most sitting at 
home working, plus, god knows how many outsourced companies” 
 
In a follow up question about the justification of manual labour due to PRS’ size, Dickinson was 
of the view that it makes sense they have more people working at PRS than a small society but 
should they had the chance to “reset” and apply technological solutions, such as automation,  
50% of the employees currently working at the organisation, would not be needed today. 
 
“Yes, we have got more members  and yes we are a bigger country with more broadcasters, 
more hairdressers and pubs and so on. But also I think, like I said, if we had 2 years to rebuild 
everything from zero, we could do it and we would not need half the number people we’ve got 
working here. I think all collecting societies have this problem because a lot of it is very 
“manual labour intensive”. You need a lot of human intervention on a lot of these things because 
they have never been perfect databases of the works. Mine will disagree with yours, STIM’s will 
disagree with GEMA’s and so there are always things like that, that will slow it down”. 
 
McEwen believed that standardizing copyright data  in a big data context is crucial: 
 
“(...) I think it is crucial that we get a single authoritative source of ownership information 
because a lot of the problems and the challenges that we face currently come from the fact that 
you have competing versions of the truth in terms of who owns or represents the specific rights 
and anything. So, I think that is something that is of crucial importance. I think in terms of 
streaming in particular and certainly the challenges from streaming come from this cheap scale 
of data volumes. (...) we have gone in a matter of a few years from hundreds of millions of lines 
(usages process) to billions of lines; 250 billion or whatever in terms of the scale of this process. 
That is a massive big data challenge”. 
 
He then mentioned that data challenges inevitably push CMOs towards a collaborative approach: 
 
“What that does is for CMOs to increasingly partner and work together to try and insure that 
they are in a position to operate effectively in that kind of a world. So that is definitely one big 
bit of the challenge that comes from streaming”. 
 
He finally said that going forward, new technologies are very promising and may help towards 
issues with identification of copyright data 
 
“In lots of ways the move to streaming and online generally brings obviously new technologies 
that can be deployed in terms of sound recognition technologies etc. to help identify uses of 
music that perhaps we didn't have in the past. There is a lot of work still to do in terms of 
 technologies that can identify a melody without the specific sound recording! That is certainly a 
big area of potential technology solutions (...)  moving forward, the scope for those sort of 
technologies to help improve the accuracy (not just in online but in other areas of CMO activity, 
like public performance which is a very interesting area and these sorts of technologies are 
increasingly deployed to help things more accurate). That is certainly another piece of it.. So 
online throws up a number of challenges and a number of opportunities as well!” 
 
Davies followed in the same line about data and mentioned that in a fragmented rights 
environment, data standardization is essential: 
 
“I think gradually there is this general acceptance that if you are going to have a fragmented 
rights picture then you have to have ways of enabling that but with standardization.  (...) Our 
view is that data and reference data needs to be authoritative. One place for that makes complete 
sense. That is why we were big fans of the GRD. (...) the more that data can be held centrally 
(once) and used by everybody then it will enable to kind of put in the front of that some 
individual licensing entities just representing smaller 'pockets of rights'. If you don't have that 
standardization it's incredibly complicated and it creates a very bad service for the users. 
Because they don't know who to go to get the rights, they don't know if they have cleared all the 
rights, they don't know if they have valued the rights properly etc. And on a global basis that's 
very challenging”. 
 
When asked about transparency in terms of revenue sources from abroad he mentioned that there 
is a challenge to explain the members what they are getting from their use of music, but it is a 
rather technical issue, not a question of transparency per se: 
 
“ (...) we had trillions of lines of data for different types of members and we need to make sure 
we are giving them all the information that is helpful for them to run their businesses and now 
we are working actively on developing a website portal to be able to give as much information as 
we possibly can to our members. (...) the amount of royalty that one member gets, it is quite 
difficult to understand what is that money for, for which services, which countries, over which 
periods and how do I value that. So I think that is definitely a challenge”. 
 
 
Finally, he believed that the current challenges to standardize copyright data is part of an exciting 
journey: 
 
(...) the whole point is...that is the direction of travel and I suppose..You know what? It is quite 
exciting! It's a very dynamic business. You know, what worked last year may not work next year. 
That is where the challenge is. Because you have big societies, big investments and platforms. 
Here you want data standardized, that is a challenge. You have to get everybody to join up on 
that. 
 
 4.4 Topic 4: Other 
4.4.1 New entrants 
 
Regarding the new entrants from the private sector (such as GMR and Kobalt) Dickinson 
believed that it adds an additional type of complexity: 
 
“ they are not gonna go to every hairdresser and every pub to collect money. But they can go to 
the main broadcasters (...) they can license them in concerts because if it’s you performing, then 
they know where that is happening and they can get you digital money! This is a new type of 
entrant into the market who are saying: “we are taking the best bits of the best people”. You can 
still collect from the hairdressers because that is costing you a lot of money to get to the 
hairdressers and you don’t get much from them. But we are doing the big bits. So, now this is a 
sort of new level of complication and I suppose, if they can get a better deal from broadcasters 
than ASCAP can..why not? (...) ”.  
 
When Dickinson was asked on whether there is a possibility that a CMO could do something 
very innovative like Kobalt he believed that it is difficult because of their non-profit nature of 
business: 
 
“I think here at the PRS we are certainly trying to do the best we can in as much as talking to 
PPL (neighboring rights society, UK) for joining up very possibly in 1 or 5 or 100 years we will 
join up. Which makes sense now! 15 years ago we never spoke to them. They were the enemy! 
We can do things like these but because we are not a profit-making organization, we do not have 
money to throw about. I mean, Kobalt for example have been given $16million from Google in 
this ‘venture capital funding’ to do something with.  We do not have that money, nor do SACEM 
and nor do ASCAP or anyone. So, we will never (unless go to Google and ask..maybe they would 
give us money!) but we will never spend that kind of money... or waste that kind of money, 
because we would waste it, because we are PRS.. (laughs in self-sarcasm)” 
 
When he was asked to clarify the reasons why PRS would not be able to utilize some extra 
funding coming from the private sector, he clarified that in terms of developing their own 
technology solutions this is unlikely because as non-profit CMOs (as opposed to tech companies) 
do not change the game, but rather adapt to it: 
 
“Well, we would never be able to spend that kind of money developing a system. So, we may 
never have the opportunity to do it. And so, I think a company like Kobalt will think like: Great! 
We have this money, what are we gonna do with it? Should we built something absolutely 
fantastic? Something that we think where we think the future will be in 10 years time? And, 
because of that, that is where the future goes! Whereas, if you are PRS you have to  think: This is 
what is happening today, we have to make sure we are here tomorrow! And tomorrow changes 
and then we have to change again.We are always playing catch up”. 
 
 4.4.2 Future possibilities 
 
Davies believed that PRS’ role will have to change completely in order to make their operations 
more efficient for the benefit of their members. Throughout this process of transformation, focus 
will be given on outsourcing their traditional areas of operations: 
 
“I suppose that being the champion of the creator, that when you talk about the CMOs role they 
are actually coming from a vertically integrated past where they did..everything. A society did 
everything, registered works, licensed etc. They did everything! For some societies at the 
moment they will still be operating that model, the model of doing everything. PRS has 
progressively been outsourcing and has plans to outsource almost everything else in terms of 
back office and front office activities (licensing). So, we are already on that path of 
transformation and the reason we did that, you know, we sat the strategy 5 years ago which was: 
this is how we see success in the future, having a very different role. Some of that role is exactly 
the same which is being an advocate for our rights holders to ensure that they get the best value, 
their rights are protected and they have control.. whatever makes sense. That is the bit we will 
hold on to but whether we are doing the licensing, collecting the data, managing the data, 
processing the data, those activities we judge are better scaled up. And then our rights holders 
will get the value of more efficient, lower cost, all of that”. 
 
 
His opinion about smaller CMO´s was that they will have to consolidate with other CMO´s or 
private collecting agencies - there will be more freedom of choice, more competition and more 
challenges: 
 
“(...)Other societies will have started to use the hub as a service provider;I think what that then 
means is that CMOs will be representing smaller or more sort of focused factors of rights 
holders as well as (as i said) other entities will have moved into that market as well. They may 
not be societies but they will be groupings of rights holders.. In that regard, whether it will be 
better or worse for the rights holders I think there will probably be more choice and I think more 
competition. Competition has the potential to make things better but I think some of the 
challenges related to it could still be there, you know, more competition and fragmentation could 
mean more complexity” 
 
Regarding the future of rights holders without the protection of traditional CMOs, he expressed 
scepticism:  
 
“Actually, with rights holders been part of CMOs they have had protection so whether joining 
non-society solutions will bring increased risk to the long term control and value for rights 
holders, that is something that needs to be thought about”. 
 
 
Davies then summed how the future should be like: 
 
“It is a different future.. You know what? that makes sense doesn't it? Because we have such a 
changing world and the digital revolution is enormous. How can a society continue to do what is 
 has always done” ? 
 
Dickinson’s view was very similar to Davies’ regarding the changing role of CMOs, but was 
concerned about the ability of CMOs to change the way they operate before private competitors 
make them obsolete:  
 
“(...) in 10 years time things will be hugely different to how they are now. Possibly someone like 
Google will look and say: We can do this! We can do it for more or less for free! It may mean 
that the hairdressers no longer pay for the performing right. It may mean that broadcasters pay 
a bit less, it may mean that some writers earn a lot more. But I think for the CMOs, unless we 
can change really really rapidly and know what the future is going to be (which we don’t) I think 
we are finished, really.. Someone else will come along, like Kobalt, and find a way of doing some 
of it better and cheaper” 
 
Regarding the future of smaller CMOs he also agreed that they will have to consolidate to 
survive in the market:  
 
“I think the only way to survive will be through being part of a bigger body, really. Just like 
everyone benefits from being in the EU, maybe not you Norwegians”.  
 
He elaborated on the advantages of being part of a bigger group, where CMOs could specialize 
in different operating areas: 
 
“(...) there will be an advantage for SACEM or TONO or whatever being part of a larger group 
and overtime I think these groups will start to specialise in what they are good at. You know, as 
much as, let’s say our ICE hub,  we might actually realize we are really good at licensing 
broadcasters but we are not very good at licensing pubs. So maybe, SACEM, SIAE might say: we 
are actually very good at that so they might move in and start doing that or they are good at 
collecting and we are good at distributing, they are good at digital we are good at this, or 
something like this. I think overtime maybe we’ll start to specialise more in doing things like 
these”.  
 5.Discussion 
 
5.1 What challenges are the traditional CMOs facing in the digital 
era?  
 
In this chapter the results of the interviews will be linked with the theoretical background in 
chapter two. Similarities and differences will be drawn in order to provide answers to each of the 
research questions. The interview results show that the topics of discussion are in many ways 
connected to each other, which is part of the complexity of the research subject. In order to 
answer the first research question in the most simplified way, the topics will be discussed 
separately. The second part of this chapter brings those topics together to discuss the possibilities 
for CMOs in the future and provide an answer to the second research question. 
 
-Fragmentation of rights 
  
The results from the interviews regarding this topic support the theory in chapter two. What 
makes the results particularly interesting is that although the interviewees had generally a good 
understanding about the situation of rights fragmentation and as an effect, the increased 
complexity in their operations, they chose to touch upon this topic from their own, different 
perspectives. 
Dickinson believed that the fragmentation of rights is an issue that will only get more 
problematic for the CMOs and that the analogue system based on reciprocity and territorial 
control worked much better. This view reflects a large part of the theory presented in chapter two 
about the benefits of reciprocity and collaboration between CMOs with regards to multi-
territorial licensing (Laing, 2004; Towse, 2012; Katz, 2005; Wallis 1999; ELIAMEP 2009).  
In contrast, Dyball was of the view that the major publishers really helped the market by 
withdrawing their rights from the CMO system. That is because the CMOs were unable to adapt 
quickly and take decisions on how to deal with digital licensing. In that sense, the publishers 
contributed towards making CMOs embrace the new terms brought by the digital market. This 
view reflects the arguments against the monopoly status of the CMOs (KEA, 2006; Liu Wenqi, 
2012; Babita et al. 2009). She nonetheless acknowledged their essential role when it comes to 
aggregating and licensing large repertoires which include the small uses of music that could 
otherwise be impossible to license individually, as also pointed out by Kretchmer (cited in 
Towse, 2012) in chapter two. 
McEwen and Davies seemed less critical on this development and appeared more 
acceptive of the fact that the digital market now operates with different rules than the analogue. 
They were relatively optimistic about the future, in contrast with Dickinson who generally 
seemed more cautious. They both mentioned that due to fragmentation there are many digital 
services that do not know how to obtain all the necessary licenses as mentioned by Butler (2016) 
and KEA (2012). 
  
   
-Competition 
The CMOs have gone from principles of reciprocity and solidarity to a new phase of competing 
for services, repertoire and the price rate they charge for these. The competitive framework in the 
digital world is therefore  related with the fragmentation of rights. 
When asked their opinion about competition in CMO activities, all interviewees referred to the 
legislative developments in Europe and particularly the 2005 Recommendation from the 
European Commission, which paved the way for major structural changes in traditional 
collective management. 
Dickinson noted that the fragmentation of rights has inevitably brought competition on 
price for obtaining music licenses. He explained that DSP’s have the option to seek the cheapest 
licensing deal and that inevitably puts a price tag on the songs included in those licenses, 
something that he considered a great disadvantage for the creators and their CMOs who may 
receive less revenue and are not in a position to compete in order to increase it. Dickinson 
generally believed that competition works very well for businesses that create and sell products 
but the European Union has misunderstood the area of collective management. A company may 
well reduce the price of a product or even improve its features in order to become competitive in 
the market. On the other hand, a composer would not have that ability because as seen in chapter 
two, music as digital content is naturally non-rival (Morreau, 2013; Towse, 2004). It is not 
something that can have its price reduced or increased to achieve greater revenue. This is a very 
important point, because Dickinson drew a considerable difference between competing on price 
for quality of CMO services versus competing on price for “quality” of songs included in the 
CMOs licensing deal. This point was that this type of competition fragments repertoires based on 
price and may be a threat to regional CMOs and cultural diversity, as presented in the theory 
chapter with the critical considerations by GESAC (2014), Laing et al. (2015), Wallis et al. 
(1999), and Kretchmer (2001). The same theory suggested that there is a difficulty for smaller 
CMOs to compete in such market environment. and this is reflected in Dickinson’s and Davies’ 
view on the matter. They both said that less dominant CMOs will have to consolidate and be part 
of a bigger group if they want to survive in the market. Both Davies and McEwen suggested that 
a certain level of collaboration between societies is necessary in the online world. Their 
examples touched upon the technical solutions that are being developed and the collaboration 
through hubs for copyright administration and licensing.  
From Dyball’s point of view, competition is good because it boosts efficiency and makes 
commercial deals go much quicker than in the analogue world, where CMOs (being non-
commercial, natural monopolies) would be very slow to react to making commercial deals and 
embrace the new concepts of the digital market. Their position had a negative effect to the whole 
value chain (their publishers, their members) as well as legitimate businesses who wished to 
develop services in the digital market and could not engage with the traditional “providers” of 
the world repertoire - the CMOs. Similarly, McEwen thought that competition is the key towards 
developing more efficient technological solutions to deal with the challenges of digitalization. 
These views are connected to the arguments for competition by Bonadio (2012), Wenqi (2012) 
as well as the European Comission’s objective with the Directive 2014/26/EU to improve the 
efficiency of CMOs in the digital age.  
 On the other hand, their views oppose KEA (2006) and Bonadio (2008) who argued that such 
competitive framework would not be possible for smaller/regional European CMOs because 
their members would have many linguistic and cultural obstacles to migrate to a more 
competitive CMO.  
 
-Data Processing 
  
 
The theory suggested that with the dissemination of music on the internet, the collection and 
distribution of revenue would become a lot more difficult in the digital age (Frith, 2004). In this 
context, having the correct copyright information becomes very important to allocate and 
distribute remuneration to rights holders. The feedback from the interviewees regarding data 
processes certainly illuminates this challenge.  
 Dyball considered this topic the most important challenge for CMOs in the digital world. 
First, she mentioned that there is a lot more data to be processed - a view that was shared by 
McEwen, who referred to it as a “massive big data challenge” and mentioned that there are about 
250 billion lines of usages compared to about 100 million that were to be processed some years 
ago. Davies mentioned that PRS has received trillions of lines of data for different types of 
members. These indications fall into the supporting theory in chapter two about the vast 
dissemination of music as digital content on the internet (Wikström, 2013; Krueger, 2006;  IFPI, 
2016). Secondly, Dyball mentioned the importance of improving the efficiency and 
sophistication of current technological systems, which would allow the processing of data with 
more automation. She considered that such systems would become more effective if CMOs 
could also agree on mutual protocols on how data should be processed. For example, a CMO in 
country A may register copyright information differently than CMO in country B, so the 
database systems used by different CMOs do not communicate efficiently. This is where data has 
to be processed manually every time it does not fit the requirements to be “recognized” and 
processed automatically by a computer. The second part of the problem is that without a 
common agreement between CMOs on how copyright data should be processed results in 
musical works being in unnecessary disputes or having inaccurate information purely because of 
a misinterpretation of data between CMOs. 
Similarly with Dyball’s opinion, Dickinson believed that when databases between 
societies disagree on data, human intervention to process it becomes inevitable and is very 
problematic for all CMOs as it slows down the process, making it expensive and insufficient to 
deal with enormous numbers of data coming from different sources. He also thought that there 
needs to be more automation as much as it is easy for digital services and telcos to accumulate 
detailed information very quickly and precisely. Their opinions reflect the report by Owsinski 
(2016) and the inadequate data disclosure by CMOs supported by Wenqi, (2012). The theory 
also pointed at previous attempts by the CMOs to build a common database for copyright 
ownership such as the GRD (Cook, 2015), which would have common rules on how data is 
registered and processed. The GRD project indicates that the CMOs had foreseen the problem 
but could not agree on a common solution (Milosic, 2015). Furthermore, Dickinson believed that 
the reasons the CMOs are dealing with this kind of challenge lies in their century-long 
background. If PRS was to start operating today it would have been much easier for them, in 
terms of organizing and investing in the right technology solutions. Both McEwen and Dickinson 
 thought that it is more important to adapt rather than restart everything from the beginning, 
which would make things a lot more difficult for them. On the same note, Davies mentioned that 
the CMOs come from a vertically integrated past were they were responsible for everything 
(from works registrations to licensing and distribution). Their comments reflect Moreau (2013) 
in his article about disruptive innovation and the greater difficulties for a vertically integrated 
company to adapt new business models by investing in disruptive innovation. The failure to 
deliver the GRD, the fear about taking financial risks by CMOs in the digital market (as 
expressed by Dyball), and the century old, vertically integrated past of CMOs as expressed by 
Dickinson, Davies and seen in chapter two, are all indications that justify the initial scepticism 
and inability of CMOs to engage with the concept of disruptive innovation and deal efficiently 
with data challenges today. Davies and McEwen seemed strategically oriented regarding this 
topic and were of the view that standardizing data in the digital age is crucial and most effective 
when there is collaboration between CMOs. This could be achieved through hubs where a 
number of national CMOs combine their repertoires in a single database for works registrations 
(in the likes of the GRD, but with much smaller scope). This could potentially reduce the 
existing issue with inaccuracies of copyright data, as described in previous paragraphs. They 
both supported that hubs deliver ‘one stop shop’ for pan-european licenses which would include 
a combination of national repertoires. One stop shops solutions are desired by the European 
Union (Directive 2014/26/EU) and are traditionally attractive to users  (Laing, 2004; Towse, 
2012; Katz, 2005).  
 
The interview findings regarding this topic have exposed a rather interesting paradox. In a world 
of high connectivity, where technology makes geographical borders irrelevant and the sharing of 
data on the Internet is easier than ever (Wikström, 2013; Blum, 2012), the globalized concept of 
the online world becomes problematic in data administration when applied on IT systems that 
have previously been developed without any connectivity with each other, as in the case of 
CMOs. 
5.2 How can they stay relevant in the future? 
 
The theory and interview findings have revealed strong indications that collecting societies have 
to think their business differently, by embracing technology and improving their services in order 
to become more relevant to their members than they are today. 
      In the analogue world, revenue from licensing music was taken for granted; all new 
music and promising composers began their careers by joining their national CMO because there 
was no other place they could go to for copyright protection. It is evident that this concept in the 
digital age does not guarantee anymore that the rights holders will not migrate from the 
collective to a different licensing body, which seems to be the case for the high earners and 
major publishers. The theory supports that the functioning of the CMOs depended on those high 
revenues. New entrants, i.e. Kobalt Music and probably more new players (expected by Davies 
and Dickinson) will prevail in the music market. Non-traditional collecting agencies will target 
those revenues and have their arms open for high earners with international scope, who seek 
efficient and technologically advanced solutions to manage their rights. The new entrants aim to 
provide services that are currently more efficient and cheaper compared to traditional CMOs. 
The interviews and theory point out that there are several things they can do to stay relevant, but 
 it is advised to not rest too many years. Here Dickinson believed that CMOs must change their 
analogue philosophy ‘very rapidly’ before their challenges become immediate threats.   
      First, they need to identify and acknowledge the problem areas that have been addressed 
in the previous paragraphs. This study has included the view of two collecting societies that are 
on top of their game, to say the least, so they seem to be aware of the challenges and have been 
able to invest money and work towards developing technological solutions. However, it is not 
certain that all regional CMOs are actively working towards transforming their operations. As 
Davies pointed out, many societies out there still choose to operate the model of ‘doing 
everything’, which the theory suggests that it is expensive and inefficient in the digital age. 
Those societies are perhaps the most vulnerable in that regard for developing competitive 
services, which can compete for attracting members and retain the local talent and domestic 
rights within their organization. The smaller CMOs need to prove to their members that they are 
able to provide value in their membership with efficient and modern services. In the online world 
this can be achieved by investing in technological solutions, in collaboration with other CMOs. 
As pointed out by McEwen and Dickinson, smaller actors will have to consolidate – being part 
of a bigger group will be the only way for a CMO to survive in the digital market. In that sense, 
collaboration is essential for common investments and mutual benefits by smaller CMOs. The 
next paragraphs summarize the recommended areas to improve. 
      Investing in technology that specializes in finding online royalties even for small sums 
across the internet (as well as offline). All indications here suggest that in the digital world, it 
seems unlikely that a single CMO will be able to carry the full cost for developing their own 
technology. Even a powerful CMO like PRS, according to Dickinson, would not be able to do 
that by themselves. Therefore CMOs will be required to reach out to existing technological 
solutions provided by private companies and join forces to share the costs. 
      Speeding up transactions is another important area that CMOs can improve. In a world 
where information is accessed and shared almost instantly, the members can no longer wait 
months or years (as seen in chapter two) to receive their revenue. This in theory is related to data 
issues because the longer it takes to identify a writer the slower the payment process to the rights 
holder will be. This indicates that CMOs will have to be able to match their catalogue (their 
copyright data) as fast as possible once they have received the usage reports provided by, for 
example, DSP’s, TVs and radio stations. Fast data processing will speed up the payment. 
      In addition, providing real time information about where music has been used can foster a 
stronger professional relationship with their members because it could function as a practical and 
marketing tool by the writer, who will be able to quickly identify the places music is used and 
discover new potentials, for example, based on popularity by region, plan tours or live shows. In 
many ways having access to that information is not the x factor, but could certainly be a bonus 
for a traditional CMO membership. 
      With regards to licensing, an aspect that could potentially increase the value of their 
membership has to do with aggregation of rights and repertoire. The CMO could establish 
private platforms, which would offer pre-cleared, bundled rights that could then be divided into 
different genres. A license that includes domestic contemporary classical music would have 
different needs than other genres. The duration, for example, is much longer than in most 
mainstream songs so in theory it should be priced differently. By uniting catalogues of genres 
together, the CMOs may realize that they can increase the value of their members’ music and an 
additional value in their membership. 
      Regardless of the size of a CMO, merging back offices in terms of databases and 
 agreeing on mutual protocols on how process data seems to be the key element towards 
improving all CMO operations, which in many ways rely on correct copyright data. All 
interviewees had a coherent view regarding this topic, and agreed that collaboration is essential 
in the digital age. It is apparent that existing technologies are not currently utilized to reach their 
full potentials and deliver quality results due to different databases and rules on how data is 
processed between CMOs. An example may be merging mechanical and performing rights 
(authors rights) with neighboring rights (artists and producers), something that was mentioned by 
Davies. This does not mean that the industry would have to replace those rights with new legal 
terms – for example, replacing mechanical, performing and neighboring with ‘digital rights’ but 
rather creating a technical standard that brings different rights and all their relevant metadata 
together to be as uniform as possible. The unification of rights has the potential to increase value 
and improve the licensing process and see support by the rights holders who would see an 
increase of value in their music. In an already very fragmented rights picture in the music 
industry, the users/DSP’s would also appreciate such move, as it would reduce the number of 
places they need to go to clear different types of rights. 
 
There are currently no technological obstacles in order to create stronger metadata structures and 
transparency that would potentially eliminate the problem of poor quality data, which affects 
revenue from copyright. The interview findings and theory support that standardizing data would 
be for the interest of all actors who collect and distribute income to rights holders so the lack of 
incentive for cooperation to tackle this issue points at one significant observation. The previous 
attempts between CMOs, publishers and record labels for a common solution, like the global 
repertoire database (GRD) have failed to exist because they could not reach political consensus. 
Although all indications show that the CMOs clearly need a collaborative approach which would 
benefit the average author and user/licensee, the private companies may have an alternative 
view. Presumably, the lack of clarity in copyright data could benefit the larger industrial players; 
as discussed in chapter two, without reciprocity and territorial control of the CMOs, the 
international, lucrative publishers and their mono-repertoire would no longer subsidize the local 
and niche music in the digital market. It is unclear if the beneficiaries from this complexity 
would ever agree on a system that seeks a common interest for the average rights holder in the 
music industry. 
 6. Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to profile the challenges the traditional collective management organizations 
are currently facing from an inside perspective and discuss ways to overcome them in order to 
stay relevant in the digital age. The author chose to focus on problem areas that CMOs should 
improve from within their own operations because no matter how the digital market evolves and 
is regulated, they need to prove that they have taken the necessary steps to be able to provide 
efficient services and have fully adapted to the new digital realities. Although it is out of the 
scope of this thesis, external threats (threats from outside the collective management industry) 
should be mentioned, as they were also touched upon during the interviews by the informants. 
The under text of this study or in more mainstream terms, the elephant(s) in the room, are 
companies like Google, Apple and Facebook. They began as Internet start-ups only a decade ago 
and today are the biggest companies in the world. Their monopoly has stretched across all 
sectors in the online sphere (Taplin, 2017). The below graph shows how quickly (in a matter of 
ten years) they dominated the global market: 
 
  
  
(Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices, in New York Times, 2017) 
 
There are real concerns that some of these technological companies might replace the CMOs. In 
this context, Bruce Dickinson gave a ten year time-frame to find efficient solutions to their own 
challenges before some other company (referring to Google) comes in to overtake their 
operations in the online world as they have done with other traditional industries, such as 
advertising, broadcasting, news and media, to name a few. The assumption is that if they wanted 
to, they have the market capacity to replace a lot of businesses of the CMOs. Youtube, for 
example, is a registry of copyrighted works, which functions on a voluntary basis, given that 
rights holders must provide their copyright information every time they request YouTube to take 
down a video that includes their copyright. Their threat to CMOs will probably depend on the 
will of governments to revisit the ‘safe harbor’ clause from the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, which paved the way for these businesses to make large sums of money from ‘free ride’ 
content, produced by others (Taplin, 2017). When looking at the future and relevance of CMOs 
and certainly touching upon Dickinson’s ten-year time frame, this is an indication of how fast 
things can change in a market and outlines the urgency for CMOs to “level up” in their digital 
game. For them, having a century long tradition in being natural monopolies, this realistic 
scenario may be more difficult to grasp as an immediate threat. In order for CMOs to stay 
relevant and strong against a common, external threat, they should first set clear rules on which 
areas they need to collaborate and which to compete in way that is not putting in disadvantage 
any of them. That is to say that the end result should aim for more efficiency, not only for the 
lucrative CMOs but also for the small, regional ones. For example, competition on price, 
according to Dickinson will not be good for anyone, certainly for the smaller CMOs. On the 
other hand, competition for memberships and services is very different as it aims to encourage 
efficiency without decreasing the value of another society’s rights. 
 For over a century the CMO network, based on a system of collaboration and 
professional binding rules, has been functioning quite well to this day. This is a remarkable 
achievement, which dates back to the Berne Convention. How likely is it that future regulation 
will work in favour of dominant private companies and disregard the structures of the Berne 
Convention, making CMOs completely irrelevant? The odds still point at Berne.  
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 Appendix 
-List of interview questions 
  
Interview 1 - Jane Dyball 
  
-We have seen turbulence in the music industry in the last decade and many of the developments 
have of course influenced the way a CMO operates today. Especially CMOs have been targeted 
about their efficiency and their relevance in a new competitive market. What do you think are the 
current challenges for the traditional collective management organizations? 
-Do you think the legal structures from the analogue world adapted well into digital? Here I am 
referring to streaming which is a combination of both mechanical and performing rights. 
-Why have strategic approaches for collaborative solutions in the digital world such as the 
Santiago and Barcelona Agreements not been preferred to competition? 
-I think the next question fits right in! What are the advantages of competition in the CMO 
system? 
-Do you see European CMOs creating more hubs in the future? Say the Scandinavians on their 
own, the Balcans on their own, etc.? 
 
Interview 2 - Bruce Dickinson 
  
-  What is your view on the whole CMO system of reciprocal agreements between territories and 
countries, in the online world?  Has that really worked out, so far? 
- Who decides the percentage that a CMO would charge in this case? Should that be based on the 
size of the repertoire each national CMO controls? 
- In the online world, publishers got the chance to pull their rights out of the CMO system. Is this 
a real issue for PRS? 
- Except publishers, what is your view of the new entrants who are not publishers, and not 
traditional CMOs, such as Kobalt, Global Music Rights etc? We have not seen anything like this 
in the analogue world. Could they pose  threats to traditional CMOs? 
- The CMOs have been heavily criticized about their incapacity to adapt to digital and find ways 
to run their operations effectively. Do you share this view? 
- It sounds as if CMOs in general must find a way to overcome these issues. Is there room for a 
total “reset” as a future solution? 
- But we do have a lot more members than IMRO… Doesn’t it make sense that PRS requires a 
 lot more resources? 
- What I understand is that if we had “clean data” or an international centralized database, 
something like the GRD, this complexity and manual labor would theoretically be significantly 
smaller, is that right? 
- What do you think about the proposition of charging an extra pound every month through the 
ISP, as a levee to support “less popular” writers? So to keep a certain level of solidarity… 
- You have worked at PRS for a long time and you have seen it evolve, along with other 
societies. Do you think that competition in the traditional CMO industry will deliver more 
efficiency in what we do? Does competition function in today’s digital industry? 
- In other words, would you say that if a writer really wants to make money from music, they 
have to play along with market rules? Sort of “forced” in this framework to become more 
commercial themselves? 
- Who does competition work for, in your opinion? 
- More and more societies get together to create create “hubs” for licensing and other collective 
rights management services in the music industry. ICE, is the prime example of this. Do you 
think this will happen more in the future? 
- What is the picture of this at the moment for PRS? Has PRS become better at collecting from 
pubs etc? 
- How about the distribution of income from those licenses? 
- Any positive thoughts about the future? What should be the perhaps the first thing CMOs 
should focus on? 
- Could CMOs do something like Kobalt? 
- I do like your sarcasm! But why would PRS not be able to use funding coming from i.e. 
Google? 
 
Interview 3 - Ben McEwen 
  
- Streaming seems to be the way people will consume music in the future, yet a lot of analogue 
concepts are still being used (we use the same system of copyright). With the dissemination of 
music all over the internet and the current copyright structures, do you think this is a sustainable 
model for the collection, clearance and distribution of rights? 
- Isn't it harder to identify works online now with streaming? What is the first step we should 
take as CMOs to make things work as well as making sure people understand it? 
- Wouldn't that take a lot of investing? 
- If almost everything can be found on the internet, could  mandatory licensing ever work 
positively towards the creator? The example is that everyone gets to use whatever music they 
want, and based on whatever revenue they receive, they pay the rights holders. 
- What if we (well, perhaps the government) made it mandatory that the collection happens 
through a particular party? 
 - The next question is about competition. Are CMOs better off with a strategy based on 
competition or collaboration? 
- Everything you have mentioned seems to be very much in line with the EC’s policy on 
competition. On the other hand, could powerful hubs as ICE dominate the market? Where there 
any concerns about the ICE hub (PRS, STIM, GEMA)  from the EC’s  competition authorities? 
- On a slightly different note, do you think your members understand these issues and 
challenges? How can we get the people to understand what the problem really is? 
 
Interview 4 - Graham Davies 
 
- We have seen attempts to shift the old solutions from the analogue into the digital world, using 
a system that a lot of critics suggest that it functioned well in the analogue world. To what extent 
does that function in today’s digital industry? 
- I see… Do you think the digital economy has been growing in Europe? 
- Previous attempts between societies to adapt in digital were based on collaboration. For 
example the Santiago agreement would extend the offline system to online. Why do you think 
that did not work out? 
- Many people considered the GRD as a solution some years ago, which in theory would be very 
helpful towards standardizing data as well as bringing together all those unique codes for 
ownership identification (ISWC, ISRC etc.) Could you tell me a little bit more about that project 
and why ICE followed after? 
- Have other CMOs followed this direction? 
- So seeing how things have evolved… are you positive? 
- With all those data issues that societies are aware of, and with the recent EU Directive on 
CMOs focusing a lot on transparency.  How transparent can a CMO be at the moment, in terms 
of providing correct information about royalties, for example? Is that a challenge? 
- On a national level it is much easier to be very transparent but isn't it difficult to understand 
what money you are getting when it is in many different places? 
- One of my main objectives for coming to London for my placement was to find out if the 
people who represent the creators, like you, Jane Dyball etc. know what is going on.. And it 
seems that the PRS is aware of a lot of these things… 
- Are there any ways...? 
- Is there any entity that can issue a pan-european license right now? You were talking about 
global licensing but I don't think we have this on a pan-european scale, do we? 
- Do you see that happening now with Gema and Stim? a blanket license for all three? Given that 
you have ICE kind of sorted and you are in conjunction? 
- From recent figures it seems that performance income is going up and mechanical down. Has 
the performance income been compensating for the loss of mechanical? 
- But there is no link between these too and it remains a bit confusing I guess. Is there a way to 
 tackle this challenge? 
- Could there be any government intervention to say: we have to make things simpler here for 
our creators and common benefit (in EU level)? 
- Where do you see the industry in 10 years from now? A better or worse place for the creators? 
More or less remuneration? More or less power for the CMOs ? Where is this whole thing going 
to? 
- But.. are the CMOs going to survive through this complexity? Can a Collective retain their 
principles in the future? It has always been fascinating to me, the historical, traditional 
institutions and how they promote creativity and being the bearers of culture if you will. Is that 
going to change? 
 
 
 
 Transcripts 
 
 
 
 
Interview 1:  Jane Dyball 
 
KEFALAS: Thank you so much for having me. I think your input would be very valuable! think 
we are tight on schedule, right? so I am jumping right in. 
 
DYBALL: Yes. Ok!  
 
KEFALAS: We have seen turbulence in the music industry in the last decade and many of the 
developments have of course influenced the way a CMO operates today. Especially CMOs have 
been targeted about their efficiency and their relevance in a new competitive market. What do 
you think are the current challenges for the traditional collective management organizations? 
  
DYBALL: I think the challenges are firstly to make collective management more efficient and 
more cost effective. CMOs provide a valuable function and an essential function probably 
because they unite… you know, they aggregate repertoire and then they license it especially for 
small uses that you can't license. It's just not cost effective to license individually. So, it's a very 
expensive way of doing it, there is a lot of room for saving money. And that seems to be going 
up rather than down! I think the cost of CMOs across Europe is a bit over 1 billion euros per 
year. That is how much they cost. So, that is a lot of money for a lot of repetition. Even if you 
take 25% out of that, that is money from revenue streams. So there is a challenge to cut cost, 
especially while the amount of effort is increasing. We have more lines of revenue to process, 
you need more powerful processes in order to process data and get through that level of 
information in order to distribute it…there has to be more automation and more agreement 
between societies as to protocols and ways of invoicing. t is no longer acceptable, I think, for a 
British society to say: But this is how the market operates in Britain. I am not using a real 
example, but in the UK you might be invoicing a digital service quarterly, in Sweden you might 
be invoicing them monthly, in Holland you might do that manually.. Here, I am specifically 
talking about protocols that are different from country to country. For example, if 3 people write 
a song, you can't say 1/3 and 1/3, you have to say 33%. So everybody registers their claim for 
their song writer for 33.34%. If you register a creator with 33.34% you get to over 100%. That 
then puts the song into dispute. So, you have to think about those protocols to save time and 
money. Everyone has to agree a protocol around data to make it easier to process data. So, there 
is lots of protocols that have not been agreed about how companies invoice or how copyright 
information is registered. If I register a Radiohead song I might register it under the name of 
Thom Yorke someone else might register it under the name of Thomas York, somebody might 
spell it as Tom… 
Another challenge is the commercial terms around the deals. And around whether 
Youtube are paying enough money or Spotify are paying enough money. The problem with that 
is, it is sometimes difficult to see what the problems are around the commercials because they 
 are affected by the data. So, if you are a writer and look at your royalty statement and say: oh, 
I've got 10p from Spotify and 15p from Youtube. That means Youtube is good and Spotify is 
bad! That would be the wrong conclusion to reach. Not necessarily that Youtube is bad and 
Spotify good but it would be wrong  to reach any conclusion from the information you've got 
from your statement because that information is being affected by all of those data issues. So, if 
you are getting a statement that you are getting 15p from Youtube and 10p from Spotify it is 
virtually meaningless. It gives you no information other than how much money is in your 
statement. Because different decisions will have been made in order that you get that money and 
until you understand all those decisions you can't be informed as to decide whether it is better to 
have 15p or 10p. 
 
  
KEFALAS: Do you think the legal structures from the analogue world adapted well into digital? 
Here I am referring to streaming which is a combination of both mechanical and performing 
rights.  
  
DYBALL: I don't think the legal structures are the issue. Mechanical is a copy, so it is not about 
buying it is about copying. So while you are a subscriber you are making copies. (…) I also think 
it is very difficult to change copyright or any aspect of copyright. To take rights away.. So if you 
said: OK, there should not be a mechanical in subscription service that would be impossible. 
Because people have paid for those rights and people have invested in those rights. And if you 
are, you know, a music publisher and you have supported writers, if you give them advances so 
they can give up their job driving a truck and write songs then you have to be able to recover that 
investment. Then it would just be like someone saying: OK, sorry, we know that you have spent 
hundreds of thousands.. 
I think if there is an area that needs addressing it is the area of safe harbor. This is a problem for 
the copyright industry because it says if you are Youtube and all you do is you provide a 
platform and you claim you don't do anything and you know, somebody's putting music on 
Youtube, they might own it but have no control of what people put up, no knowledge about it 
and they say that it has nothing to do with them. That is illegal defense and is problematic 
because it means that they can create a business worth huge amounts of money and then does not 
pass any of that over to the people who write the songs. Now, some of the people who write the 
songs might not care about that because they go: Yeah! it's on Youtube! Everybody can hear it! 
So you know, that is a legal issue. 
  
KEFALAS: Why have strategic approaches for collaborative solutions in the digital world such 
as the Santiago and Barcelona Agreements not been preferred to competition?  
 
DYBALL: I was around in the Santiago agreement and Barcelona agreement at that time and 
there was a 3rd agreement which was an online M.O.U (Memorandum of Understanding) which 
would have been a very collaborative approach to digital licensing. We spent 7 years negotiating 
that. I mean.. 7 years! And after a while (I was a publisher then) I think some of the CMOs may 
have been in a bit of denial about the digital market. You know, it is impossible to imagine a 
world where it is acceptable to spend 7 years discussing anything really. It is no wonder that the 
level of frustration was so high that you just think.. right.. we can't afford to not do anything. We 
can't afford just to postpone this and leave it for tomorrow again and again. But we had to do 
 something about it and at that time I was working for a publishing company and there was no 
option but to say: This is a business I want to engage in and if the societies system is not going to 
engage in there for me, then I am going to engage. You know, these digital services they are not 
all bad people. You know, there was a lot of fear in digital services and a fear of engaging or 
agreeing rates which you might later regret. And if you are a commercial organization then you 
have to make deals! You just have to make deals otherwise you can't carry on. But what was 
problematic back then was that if you were a CMO you didn’t have to make deals. Not quite so 
much. You know, you've got enough business to not make deals.. So the societies have changed 
now. They have become a much more embraced concept of making a deal but back then there 
was a real fear that if you did a deal you would later regret it cause you charged the wrong 
amount and nobody knew what the right amount was. 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: I think the next question fits right in! What are the advantages of competition in the 
CMO system? 
  
DYBALL: I think fundamentally competition is good. It means that people have to be as good as 
they can be to attract business. I think that it speeds things up, it makes it easier, you can cut a 
deal.. I believe in the exclusive nature of rights. So I don't believe that every CMO should be 
able to license everybody's repertoire for example. Because then you would have societies 
undercutting each other. But I believe that if I own rights, it is good for me if I have got a choice 
of which society I am going to let license my rights. I think deals get done much more quickly 
when the people that own the rights are able to drive the deal terms. You know, it's much easier 
if you are able to negotiate yourself.  So, uhm.. you have to just carry on. I think that the 
publishers taking matters into their own hand really…helped the market. Now there is quite a bit 
of criticism because the DSPs go: Oh my god, I have to go to all these people, it would be so 
much easier going to once place and getting once license. They do have to go around and get it 
and then they complained about it but what they forget was what it was like before, where you 
could not get any engagement. 
 
KEFALAS: Do you see European CMOs creating more hubs in the future? Say the 
Scandinavians on their own, the Balcans on their own, etc.? 
 
DYBALL: Yeah, I mean, the Mediterranean societies would say that they already got a hub 
cause they've got Harmonia. I don't know enough about Harmonia to know whether it is a hub or 
not. But they have had this joined venture for some time. So, yeah ,I think there is a distinction 
between the back office and the front office. So Delta is the back office, which is about engines 
and processing. Zeta is the hub for the front office which is about negotiating. So, I think there is 
a much more crucial role for Delta. I think there is a real market need to merge back offices 
because it is any like pieces of machinery, the more you push through the machinery the cheaper 
it should be and the most cost effective. For 'front office licensing' I am not so convinced about it 
because I don't like the idea of delegating licensing I think it does not work very much. 
Delegating licensing works for mechanical if you are licensing a record company because there 
is no negotiation. There is one once every 10 years or there is an argument once every 10 years 
about how much the record company is going to pay for mechanical rights. So it works for 
 licensing broadcasters but not for online because you've got to have negotiations. 
 
DYBALL: Oh here he is!  
 
(Robert Ashcroft, CEO at PRS, has arrived for a meeting).  
 
DYBALL: Andreas, this is Robert Ashcroft. Andreas is doing his work experience at Streatham 
and is a student of Benedict? 
 
KEFALAS: Bendik! 
 
DYBALL: I always call him Benedict! 
 
ASHCROFT: Oooh God, Bendik, yes! I know him very well yeah. He is a good man. 
 
KEFALAS: Very nice to meet you!  
 
DYBALL: Goodbye Andreas, let me know if you need anything else!  
 
KEFALAS: Thank you so much for everything! Bye!  
 
 
 
 
 
END  
 
 
 Interview 2: Bruce Dickinson   
 
 
  
KEFALAS: First of all, thank you so much for accepting to do this interview. 
 
DICKINSON: That is alright!  
 
KEFALAS:  What is your view on the whole CMO system of reciprocal agreements between 
territories and countries, in the online world?  Has that really worked out, so far?  
  
DICKINSON: It was fine when everything was limited to one country. So, when broadcasting 
didn’t spill over borders and before internet messed everything up. We were perfectly well. The 
pRS could license the BBC, SACEM could license TV2 and we could license hairdressers in 
London and SACEM could license coffee shops in Paris and so on. I think that worked perfectly 
well and the idea of  OK,  we pay your writers, you pay our writers was a perfectly sensible good 
system. The difficulty now is, as we have rapidly moved from (20 years ago no one knew what 
the internet was, really!) now, since things have become more globalized it has become much 
more complex. In many ways it should have made it much easier in as much as PRS should be 
able to go to Apple or Spotify and say: We’ll license you for the whole world. The difficulty is 
that if we say we are gonna do it for 10%, someone else will do it at 9% and someone else at 8%. 
So I think especially in Europe at the moment, we are in a real difficulty of: Do we all decide we 
all charge 8%? (In which case we have fixed the price). Or do we say: charge whatever you 
want? And whoever charges the lowest, the man who charges 1% wins. but the writers don’t get 
anything! So it’s a really difficult balance I think between charging the right amount, not 
collaborating to fix a price and yet still getting a decent value for everybody. 
  
KEFALAS: Who decides the percentage that a CMO would charge in this case? Should that be 
based on the size of the repertoire each national CMO controls? 
  
DICKINSON: Generally the market decides what the price is. But once this spills over borders, 
this is difficult, because the market in Spain is different than the market in Britain. So PRS could 
go to Spotify and say: you should pay us 10% because we’ve got Paul Mc Cartney, Elton John or 
someone else..bloody Coldplay or whatever (as if anyone wants to pay for that), but obviously 
we haven’t got all the French, German or Italian writers or the very good Swedish writers. So, 
obviously, as you are probably aware, what is happening more and more is that you start to get 
these ‘groupings’. Be it a publisher, be it SONY, saying we are licensing all our stuff through 
SACEM or be it PRS saying right, we’ve got all of these writers AND ASCAPS writers and 
BMI’s writers and Australian writers so you start getting these groups that they have nothing to 
do with the country, maybe nothing to do with the publisher and so really what we are trying to 
do now is to aggregate the rights as much as we can, without ever having 100% (fee) because 
then we have a monopoly and that’s wrong. 
  
KEFALAS: In the online world, publishers got the chance to pull their rights out of the CMO 
system. Is this a real issue for PRS? 
  
 DICKINSON: Yes! When it started off, about 15 years ago, I think a lot of the publishers 
thought: we can do this ourselves better and cheaper But I think they realized very quickly that 
they couldn’t, which is why essentially, we do all the work. They just give us the rights and we 
get to take a small amount of money for it. But I think that Universal and SONY said that they 
could not do this on their own at the moment, because the CMOs have 100years experience in 
doing this, but they don’t have the experience of doing that level of detail. They can do the 
licensing, no problem (they are quite good at that) but the administration and the distribution side 
of it is different. But it has, and will become more problematic. I think, what they call the 
‘GEMA categories’. This is: If you are a writer and you join a society, generally if you join PRS 
you give us all your performing rights for all ‘usages’ for all countries. You have always been 
allowed to pick and choose the countries, for example, having a membership with the PRS but 
excluding USA and let ASCAP take care of that part, or STIM for Sweden. So, you join STIM 
for Sweden and PRS for the rest of the world. Now..More and more you can say: I am giving you 
my rights but my online rights are going to another body, maybe Universal, maybe a friend of 
yours who can negotiate with Spotify. So you can say that your broadcasting rights are going 
there and your live rights go here and the picture gets much more complicated. If it is only digital 
or online it is maybe not so bad, because that is already very fragmented. But I think if you 
decide that your broadcasting rights stay with PRS but my cinema rights will go with SACEM. 
Here is an example: if GEMA collects money for you, they have to think: Right! We’ve got 
100$. From that 25$ is for broadcasting so that goes to the PRS, 5$ is for cinema, so that needs 
to go to SACEM, instead of saying: OK, right, It’s all for him and it all goes to PRS. So this will 
make things much much more complicated 
  
  
KEFALAS: Except publishers, what is your view of the new entrants who are not publishers, and 
not traditional CMOs, such as Kobalt, Global Music Rights etc? We have not seen anything like 
this in the analogue world. Could they pose  threats to traditional CMOs?  
  
DICKINSON: GMR is an organization in USA who have attracted about 100 major artists, 
possibly Prince, The Eagles, things like this. Major bands and singers and so on And they 
manage all their rights, or most of them. I think for digital and broadcasting. But they are not 
gonna go to every hairdresser and every pub to collect money. But they can go to the main 
broadcasters in America, they can license them in concerts because if it’s you performing, then 
they know where that is happening and they can get you digital money! This is a new type of 
entrant into the market who are saying: we are taking the best bits of the best people. You can 
still collect from the hairdressers because that is costing you a lot of money to get to the 
hairdressers and you don’t get much from them. But we are doing the big bits. So, now this is a 
sort of new level of complication and I suppose, if they can get a better deal from broadcasters 
than ASCAP can..why not? You know? So you’ve got all these new groups that are coming up. 
Then you’ve got your hubs and the publishers, your GMR type of thing and Kobalt. Everything 
Kobalt is doing now is very different and interesting.  
  
  
DICKINSON: The CMOs have been heavily criticized about their incapacity to adapt to digital 
and find ways to run their operations effectively. Do you share this view?  
  
  
 
DICKINSON: The problem here is that we started doing this 100 years ago. And..we are still 
doing it the same way we did it 100 years ago.. more or less. We are getting more from there, 
then dividing it to 10 people and then we pay it out. And that is not wrong, but there must be a 
quicker and more efficient way of doing it. This is where I think the online world can hopefully 
teach the rest of us a lot. If you are Spotify or Apple or whatever it is very easy to know who has 
paid for your songs, how many seconds your song is (if that is relevant), how long they have 
been listening etc. Spotify can divide up their money accurately and immediately, to the second. 
We have to get long logs from the BBC, from ITV, Channel 4 and from 300 other broadcasters 
in Britain and run them through some ancient cranky computer to come out with the number of 
seconds or minutes and then break that down by song and then by writers.  
  
KEFALAS: It sounds as if CMOs in general must find a way to overcome these issues. Is there 
room for a total reset as a future solution?  
  
DICKINSON: If we were starting this today, it would be much easier. But I think the perfect 
solution would be to say: PRS is gonna stop doing what is doing for 2 years and rebuild 
everything from zero. Then that would be possible, or it would be much easier to do it that way. 
But you can’t stop! Do you see what I mean? If we stop, nobody gets anything for 2 years and 
then it is more difficult to start up again. But for example, IMRO, the Irish society are quite new 
(not more than 20 years more or less). They do the same operation like us but with very very few 
people because they are a bit more modern and they can do things more quickly. Whereas we 
have got, as you have seen, a membership department of 80 people and operations department of 
50-70 people, most sitting at home working, plus, god knows how many outsourced companies. 
  
KEFALAS: But we do have a lot more members than IMRO… Doesn’t it make sense that PRS 
requires a lot more resources? 
  
DICKINSON: Yes, we have got more members  and yes we are a bigger country with more 
broadcasters, more hairdressers and pubs and so on. But also I think, like I said, if we had 2 years 
to rebuild everything from zero. We could do it and we would not need half the number people 
we’ve got working here. I think all collecting societies have this problem because a lot of it is 
very manual labour intensive. You need a lot of ‘human intervention’ on a lot of these things 
because they have never been perfect databases of the works. Mine will disagree with yours, 
STIM’s will disagree with GEMA’s and so there are always things like that, that will slow it 
down. You know..  
  
  
KEFALAS: What I understand is that if we had clean data or an international centralized 
database, something like the GRD, this complexity and manual labor would theoretically be 
significantly smaller, is that right?  
  
DICKINSON: Yes! Making sure that data is right and correcting it if it is wrong...All that takes a 
lot of manual labour and then you think, as you probably have, a mobile phone there it is, 
Vodafone or whoever you are with know every second of data you use, every second you speak, 
 every message you send and immediately they can transfer that to their systems and you know, 
nobody has to intervene 
  
 
KEFALAS: What do you think about the proposition of charging an extra pound every month 
through the ISP, as a levee to support less popular writers? So to keep a certain level of 
solidarity… 
 
DICKINSON: I don’t think that would work. I think you have to pay fairly. If my song is played 
10 times more than yours it’s probably right that I get 10 times the money you get. If you have a 
sort of basic levee system where everyone gets something out of the end , you know, you are 
going to earn money, I am going to earn money and Paul McCartney is gonna earn the same 
money. So you have to find a fair way of doing it. It has to be ‘fairly market driven’. I think.. 
looking at it from a very British point of view as opposed to a French or Spanish or German 
point of view, we perhaps look at this more as, if you are a songwriter, you do that because that 
is what you want to do. That is not your calling from God, you know.. It is not: Oh my God, I do 
this and this is all I can ever do! And if you are shit at it you are gonna do something else. For 
example, if I am not good at my job, I will find out very quickly and I will have to go and do 
something else. Whereas I think in a lot of countries it’s: oh, these poor songwriters, they work 
so hard on it, this is their love..etc. I think we don’t have the same attachment to cultural creation 
in Britain that they perhaps do in France or Spain. For us it has never been ‘the culture, the 
country’  it was always more, you get this right because it’s the law, therefore we pay you. BBC 
pays us because it is the law and you know, I suppose, for most PRS  members songwriting is 
not their only job, in that sense. Even if you are Bono or Paul McCartney the money you get 
from us is miniscule compared with what you get from the sale of records or whatever you call 
them now! Also concerts and downloads, whereas writing the song is very very small money. I 
mean, Bono probably gets 0,5million pounds a year from us.. A large amount of that will be 
from live concerts but that is maybe only 3%, 5% or 10% of the box office. So, imagine what he 
is getting for the rest of 1 concert! . 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: You have worked at PRS for a long time and you have seen it evolve, along with 
other societies. Do you think that competition in the traditional CMO industry will deliver more 
efficiency in what we do? Does competition function in today’s digital industry? 
 
 
DICKINSON: I don’t think it does, personally, I think this is where the European Commission 
has misunderstood what we do. Competition works very well on mobile phones and TVs, I think, 
brilliantly! I do not think that it works in this field because if this phone is too expensive or not 
very good you can go to Samsung or (not Nokia now.. Motorola or Windows phone or 
whatever). You can buy something else which may be cheaper or better or both! But I think in 
the world of rights..only you own your rights! Or, OK, and PRS. But again, this works in a 
market that you can choose to buy a cheaper phone, a bigger phone or better phone. But, there is 
only one person that owns your songs and that is you. I can’t go to him and say: I’d like the 
rights to play his music because he doesn’t own those rights. So, there is only one customer and 
 only one supplier in a sense and so, I could say: Ok, I will go somewhere else and buy someone 
else’s music, which is fine. But, I suppose because it is unique in that way, I don’t think it can 
work that you could have lots of different people selling your thing. If you said: Right, I am a 
songwriter, I’ve written 100 songs and they are all licensed by Gema, Sacem, Stim, PRS, 
ASCAP etc. Everyone, everywhere around the world. I think again you start to get into the who 
is doing it cheapest. Because then, I only want to pay for the cheapest one. So if you said: Right 
Bruce, this is 10 pounds from me for his songs I am going to go for the one that charges 1 pound! 
Because that is how it will work. Otherwise, there is no point in being in 10 different societies 
and so, you lose out because you have written the songs but you are getting very little money for 
them and this is where I think, you know.. If Apple finds out nobody is buying their things, they 
will reduce the price, or they will try to make them better.. or make something else! But you as a 
songwriter don’t have that ability. So I think it does not work in a ‘competitive environment’.   
 
KEFALAS: In other words, would you say that if a writer really wants to make money from 
music, they have to play along with market rules? Sort of forced in this framework to become 
more commercial themselves? 
 
 
DICKINSON: Yeah, you have no choice, you know? Because otherwise, you know, you could 
say: I am not going to be a member of any society, I’ll go to the BBC and the BBC will probably 
say: we are not interested because we get all our music from PRS. You have only written 100 
songs and we just not gonna bother playing them. If people want to buy your records, that is a 
separate matter. There is no performing right in that. But you cannot compete when there is only 
one thing you are competing for and yet you know… If you are PRS, I come to you because I 
want to use that music, other people come, broadcasters come, shops etc. But we are not 
competing with other shops or pubs. For example: If I am a pub playing music, I am not 
competing with other pubs for that license, you see what I mean? So, this is PRS and you’ve got 
3 pubs in the same road, they all play music and they all have a telly on and a radio. And let’s 
say they are all exactly the same square meters. So, they pay exactly the same price to PRS and 
they get exactly the same product. They are not competing with each other to get that! So there 
can’t be any competition for it. So it is not that pub ‘A’ says: I will pay you a little bit more and 
don’t allow them to play Beatles music, it simply does not work like that! It is not, in that sense, 
a competitive market place. You could say: I wanna pay more and get a golden iphone! And then 
there is 3 golden ones in the world, so you can’t have one, and you have got the money. 
Whereas, with music it does not work that way, you pay one price and you get everything which 
is exactly the same like the pub next to you, which pays the same price..or pays a bit less because 
he is a smaller pub, but he still gets everything. This is why competition in that sense can’t really 
work... 
 
 
KEFALAS: Who does competition work for, in your opinion? 
 
DICKINSON: In the rights world you can compete but you can’t force people to compete on 
price because that is where I think it will go badly wrong. Which is I suppose we and others are 
trying to compete and say: Right, we’ve got more rights than you. And we are in a good situation 
as much as we can say: In Europe, we can manage all the anglo-american repertoire which is 
 what people wanna listen to more or less. We’ve got this repertoire, we can do it for the 
Americans, the Australians, for anyone else who writes in English, the Irish, even…U2.. And so, 
we are in a quite good position to be able to do that and if the Spanish want to join us in our little 
hub, then they can! So we can do Spanish and English repertoire. And maybe the French and 
Germans want to create their own little hub, call it ‘Franco-German Axis’ or whatever. Ok, 
maybe not Axis! (laughs) 
 
KEFALAS: More and more societies get together to create create hubs for licensing and other 
collective rights management services in the music industry. ICE, is the prime example of this. 
Do you think this will happen more in the future? 
 
 
DICKINSON: I can see more and more of this happening because I think it will make sense and 
it will reduce costs and you can benefit from the technology of other societies, in some instances. 
And I think the only way to survive will be through being part of a bigger body, really. Just like 
everyone benefits from being in the EU, maybe not you Norwegians! So just as I suppose there is 
an advantage for a country of being in a big trading club I think there will be an advantage for 
CMOs. Being part of a larger group and overtime I think these groups will start to specialise in 
what they are good at. You know, as much as, let’s say our ICE hub,  we might actually realize 
we are really good at licensing broadcasters but we are not very good at licensing pubs. So 
maybe, SACEM, SIAE might say: we are actually very good at that so they might move in and 
start doing that or they are good at collecting and we are good at distributing, they are good at 
digital we are good at this, or something like this. I think overtime maybe we’ll start to specialise 
more in doing things like these. 
 
KEFALAS: What is the picture of this at the moment for PRS? Has PRS become better at 
collecting from pubs etc? 
  
DICKINSON: I think we have always been quite good. I mean, I have been here for 17 years 
now and I think even 17 years ago we were quite good at it. A long time ago we moved away 
from what a lot of societies in Europe still have this image of being the ‘copyright police’. You 
know: You must pay us! So for years we have been trying more to sell the benefits of music. It is 
difficult to sell people things they think they have already but somehow we manage it. more 
recently in the last couple years we have had a new PPS director who has looked at what we 
license and did a lot of research and what he saw was that 80% of nightclubs were not licensed 
by PRS. Then he said: Maybe, none of them play any music! (laughs) So there are huge areas out 
there, which for some reason we have never got around licensing but less and less. Broadcasters 
are easy, you can go get them.. Live concerts are easy generally because they are big and they 
are advertised, things like restaurants is more difficult, you know, and this is where it involves 
people walking up and down roads. It costs a lot of money and you don’t get much back but I 
think on the whole we are quite good at licensing.  
 
KEFALAS: How about the distribution of income from those licenses?  
 
DICKINSON: I think we are pretty good at distributing. We get the distribution every quarter, 
well, now every week! Small distributions all the time. There is not much money left in our bank 
 accounts, you know, a lot of the time we get it out more and more quickly. In an ideal world the 
money would come in from the BBC, then we would see: ah, yes! Great! And the money will 
come in very fast like with Vodafone counting how many minutes you have spoken and we 
would send it out straight away. And maybe one day we’ll get there…  But, not just PRS but for 
all collecting societies this is a very complicated business and complicated businesses are not 
efficient businesses, generally.  
 
 
 
KEFALAS: Any positive thoughts about the future? What should be the perhaps the first thing 
CMOs should focus on? 
  
DICKINSON: I think, make the most of the next 10 years! Because I think in 10 years time 
things will be hugely different to how they are now. Possibly someone like Google will look and 
say: We can do this! We can do it for more or less for free! It may mean that the hairdressers no 
longer pay for the performing right. It may mean that broadcasters pay a bit less, it may mean 
that some writers earn a lot more. But I think for the CMOs, unless we can change really really 
rapidly and know what the future is going to be (which we don’t) I think we are finished, really.. 
Someone else will come along, like Kobalt, and find a way of doing some of it better and 
cheaper. 
  
 
KEFALAS: Could CMOs do something like Kobalt? 
 
DICKINSON: I think here at the PRS we are certainly trying to do the best we can in as much as 
talking to PPL for joining up very possibly in 1 or 5 or 100 years we will join up. Which makes 
sense now! 15 years ago we never spoke to them. They were the enemy! We can do things like 
these but because we are not a profit-making organization, we do not have money to throw 
about. I mean, Kobalt for example have been given $16million from Google in this ‘venture 
capital funding’ to do something with.  We do not have that money, nor do SACEM and nor do 
ASCAP or anyone. So, we will never (unless go to Google and ask..maybe they would give us 
money!) but we will never spend that kind of money... or waste that kind of money, because we 
would waste it, because we are PRS.. (haha) 
 
KEFALAS: I do like your sarcasm! But why would PRS not be able to use funding coming from 
i.e. Google? 
  
DICKINSON: Well, we would never be able to spend that kind of money developing a system! 
So, we may never have the opportunity to do it. And so, I think a company like Kobalt will think 
like: Great! We have this money, what are we gonna do with it? Should we built something 
absolutely fantastic? Something that we think where we think the future will be in 10 years time? 
And, because of that, that is where the future goes! Whereas, if you are PRS you have to  think: 
This is what is happening today, we have to make sure we are here tomorrow! And tomorrow 
changes and then we have to change again.We are always playing catch up. 
KEFALAS: With all those issues, you are the Head of Risk at PRS. I guess there is a lot to do in 
this area!  Thank you very much for answering my questions! 
  
DICKINSON: No problem, I am happy to continue with this at some point! 
 
 
End. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Interview 3: Ben McEwen 
 
 
KEFALAS: First of all I want to thank you for getting in touch. Will Page (a good friend of my 
thesis supervisor Dr.Roger Wallis) suggested you as a great candidate to answer some questions 
about my thesis. I think your input will be of great value. Now, I will jump to the first question, 
if that is ok? 
 
MCEWEN: My pleasure! Yes! 
 
KEFALAS: Streaming seems to be the way people will consume music in the future, yet a lot of 
analogue concepts are still being used (we use the same system of copyright). With the 
dissemination of music all over the internet and the current copyright structures, do you think 
this is a sustainable model for the collection, clearance and distribution of rights? 
 
 
 
MCEWEN: To be honest, I think quite a lot has happened to help sort of adapt and navigate 
those. You gotta be very careful with copyright and we tend to focus a lot on that because online 
has been such a major shift but even prior to that, copyright has had to adapt repeatedly with 
changes in technology and distribution and we have done a pretty good job in doing that. For a 
person who has done this job for a long time, you know, you have come across people that 
encountered many people who say: Why don't we just rip it all up and start again?  But I think a 
lot would be lost if we did that. If we said for example: sweep away mechanical and performing 
right and put in its place 'digital rights'. And it would indeed be much simpler but actually if you 
are not careful a lot of these stuff -the devil is in the detail. You know, about how these things 
work and they have a lot of unforeseen consequences. It is more important that things keep 
adapting and changing and keep moving than it is getting too obsessed about whether or not the 
terminology we are using happens to have come from a more physical age than a digital one. But 
is it applicable? Is it being applied in a consistent way? Do people understand it? Does it work?  
 
KEFALAS: Isn't it harder to identify works online now with streaming? What is the first step we 
should take as CMOs to make things work as well as making sure people understand it? 
 
 
MCEWEN: I certainly think the aims and objectives of what was the GRD, that project did not 
deliver a single database. But there are various initiatives following on from that and obviously 
ICE (the deployment of our own copyright database at the moment) has extended out to a point 
where I think it is beyond 'phase one' of what would have been the GRD now anyway! So, I 
think it is crucial that we get a single authoritative source of ownership information because a lot 
of the problems and the challenges that we face currently come from the fact that you have 
competing versions of the truth in terms of who owns or represents the specific rights. That is 
 something that is of crucial importance. I think in terms of streaming in particular and certainly 
the challenges from streaming come from this cheap scale of data volumes. So, our operations 
guys have very good stats and graphs to show this but you know, we have gone in a matter of a 
few years from hundreds of millions of lines (usages process) to billions of lines; 250 billion or 
whatever in terms of the scale of this process. That is a massive 'big data challenge. What that 
does is for CMOs to increasingly partner and work together to try and ensure that they are in a 
position to operate effectively in that kind of a world. So in lots of ways streaming and online 
brings new technologies that can be deployed in terms of sound recognition technologies etc. to 
help identify uses of music that perhaps we didn't have in the past. There is a lot of work still to 
do in terms of technologies that can identify a melody without the specific sound recording! That 
is certainly a big area of potential technology solutions.  
 
KEFALAS: Wouldn't that take a lot of investing? 
 
MCEWEN: Yeah! It's happening! In terms of sound recognition technology, that is obviously 
quite well developed already with companies like portable magic(?) for graces notes.. and 
obviously others have the likes of Google, Youtube; they have their own system. So there is 
proprietary technology that the DSPs have developed and there are parties out there developing 
these technologies. So certainly, moving forward, the scope for those sort of technologies to help 
improve the accuracy (not just in online but in other areas of CMO activity, like public 
performance which is a very interesting area and these sorts of technologies are increasingly 
deployed to help things more accurate). That is certainly another piece of it.. So online throws up 
a number of challenges and a number of opportunities as well! I think, speaking certainly across 
different sort of sectors and talking to people that work elsewhere one of the things that we 
sometimes forget about music is how blessed we are with working in an area where if you talk 
about it and it's kind of reductive to talk about it as a product or content…but we are in a world 
where this does not go out of fashion. It is massively popular, the scale of exploitation and the 
desire to access what is being produced by songwriters and composers. Plus other areas in 
gaming where music is a key component. It is not essential but it's very important. And a number 
of areas where that exists means that in a way there are opportunities now than have never been 
before! But I think.. With online we have had specific challenges because copyright as you know 
is territorial in a way that it's developed and obviously that brings big challenges when you go 
into a multi-territorial or global environment in which the industry is developing solutions for.. 
You know, I am generally reasonably optimistic about the future. 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: If almost everything can be found on the internet, could  mandatory licensing ever 
work positively towards the creator? The example is that everyone gets to use whatever music 
they want, and based on whatever revenue they receive, they pay the rights holders.  
 
MCEWEN: The basis of the Internet in its earliest forms was the free movement of information 
and data. It is a very effective, amazingly brilliant mechanism of freely distributing content. The 
challenge therefore has always been the business model and trying to add on a revenue stream 
that doesn't deter people off from still accessing the content. I don't think the status of whether 
our licensing is mandatory or not necessarily helps. At the moment you have a situation where 
 there are big implications for license source estate refuse to license and certainly for CMOs there 
are big implications. As PRS we can't refuse to license. We have to be very actively licensing. It 
is too complicated at the moment in terms of knowing the number of places you need to make 
sure you get the rights you need.. That is something that needs to improve.  
 
KEFALAS: What if we (well, perhaps the government) made it mandatory that the collection 
happens through a particular party?  
 
MCEWEN: I guess that would improve that issue of  not knowing who to pay and who to have a 
licensing relationship with. But with mandatory licensing and you pay x. But  the  problem is 
that as the market, the models and the services evolve.. when we are licensing major services we 
are normally not licensing them for longer than 2 years the most. Even within that they will often 
be some side letters for changes in the service. They might wanna do something new or change 
something fundamental.. and so, in a way, i think the trouble with any of those solutions with 
mandatory licensing is that they don't tend to be flexible enough and the services need that 
flexibility.  The thing that you well may find if you have mandatory licensing and say: this is 
your license, this is your rate, this is what you pay is that actually you block and stifle a lot of 
services because you either set in a form that then doesn't work for certain new services or 
business models that come along OR it is such a 'de minimis' low rate that it may allows lots of 
people to generate services but it doesn't provide any way near enough revenue back for creators 
and songwriters to keep doing what they do.  I think we are better off with a system where there 
is greater aggregation of rights, so there are fewer places you need to go to get the rights that you 
need. It's a really clearly sign-posted: So say you were developing a new service and you wanna 
license rights and not having to go to certain different places with different acronyms and you 
don't know who to talk to and you don't know how to go about it.. But it is much better sign-
posted and much simpler. There is fewer places you need to go but when you HAVE that 
conversation with the rights holders you are then doing it in a more free way that lets the ultimate 
license deal that you end up with to much better reflect the nature of the model and what you 
want to do. 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: The next question is about competition. Are CMOs better off with a strategy based 
on competition or collaboration? 
MCEWEN: Yeah, What is interesting is that the past to the future is with a combination of 
collaboration and competition. I know those two things are sort of naturally and diametrically 
opposed but actually i think increasingly we are working in an environment where we are.. 
partners and collaborators in various projects that we might work on, like the GRD.. There are 
lots of examples with projects that we work on together and other areas that we license and work 
together and other areas where we actively compete. I certainly do not think it is one or the other. 
I think we do need to get.. what I talked about, the need for aggregation and the fewer places to 
have to go to get rights. I think the danger of a pure sort of 'collaboration share strategy' without 
the competitive 'impetus' is that nothing much changes. You still have all the same players doing 
things in the same way and that is definitely not the solution. Partly because it doesn't deliver 
you the kind of systems and specialization that you need to deal in this environment. You need 
fewer places that are really up to the technological challenge and providing that aggregation and 
 I think you get there through competition.. But you know, if you look at PRS's strategy it is to 
partner with like-minded societies to develop a hub that will be the competitive force in the 
market and will involve fewer places to go to get the rights. So, I think this is an example that 
combines collaboration and competition. I definitely don't think it's a neither-or.. You need to 
blend these two things to make it work.. 
 
KEFALAS: Everything you have mentioned seems to be very much in line with the EC’s policy 
on competition. On the other hand, could powerful hubs as ICE dominate the market? Where 
there any concerns about the ICE hub (PRS, STIM, GEMA)  from the EC’s  competition 
authorities? 
 
MCEWEN: The competition authorities did look at it closely. Obviously we referred it to them 
to make sure that they looked at it, because whenever you have a joint venture initiative like that 
it is going to have competition implications. But I think, you are absolutely right, what Europe is 
very much in line with what EC is seeking, which is active competition and it is clear that our 
hub is not going to represent all our repertoire by any means.. But I think that the vision here is 
that there are fewer places to go to and being able to provide the competent service and a 
sophisticated service to this market. And this market has very clear and specific needs, you 
know, when I talked about the number of usages that PRS is processing and the leaps that has 
happened.. it is an exponential growth and that is all coming through online. So I think, yes, 
absolutely.. that you looked at it from competition grounds but they have blessed it. And rightly 
so. You gotta bear in mind here that the horizons for CMOs in terms of this area is no longer: oh, 
we are effectively competing with other CMOs. It is about rights management and it has brought 
its terms! There are no reasons to think that other third party won't see many other third party 
entrance from outside from the tradition CMO world that start to be very active in this market 
place. So the boundaries of competition have changed completely and will continue to change! 
That is really important in our thinking. It is not about saying: We are the best of European 
Societies out there! Or, is our hub going to be the best out there? It is much more about saying: 
Are we continuing to be absolutely at the forefront of digital management of rights? Because 
you've got to think in these broader terms.. Who do we need to partner with? Who do we need to 
be aware of? All that in terms of what solutions are out there to take a much more flexible 
approach to the market really.. 
 
 
KEFALAS: On a slightly different note, do you think that all your members understand these 
issues and challenges? 
 
MCEWEN: No, I certainly don't think they do..  But those that take an interest like here at the 
PRS, this was made from writers and publishers so of course a core group of publishers and 
writers do understand, of course! All these developments in a lot of detail. But in terms of the 
average writer out there, I don't think they understand. I think that is definitely something that we 
need to do and that the community industry needs to do a far better job of explaining how these 
things work and why they work. Because we are on a journey at the moment, from the old world 
of national monopolies doing the licensing then to now pan-european and multi territorial deals 
we sort of still on the way to hub solution where there are fewer places you need to go. But 
probably trying to communicate all the way along that journey…it is almost better to get to a 
 place where we have furthered down the lines and there are these fewer hubs.. then absolutely 
making sure that parties understand: how do their rights are plugged into those? How does the 
money flow? How does the money come out again? Where does it go? What commissions does 
it take in? But don't forget about the importance of having the right systems and solutions to be 
able to do a deal with this market effectively. Let's not pretend that in the old world things 
worked! Far from it.. What people would have would be paper statements with thousands and 
thousands of pages with micro-payments showing on them and then all online moneys would be 
bundled in alongside broadcast money. So you would not be able to see what you are getting 
from online vs broadcast, for example… PRS for a long period of time has broken out to 
electronic statements, specific DSP by territory, by peer, how you are getting your royalties… 
but you know, moving forward into the hub the level of data that we are gonna be able to provide 
to our members is gonna be a moving forward and sophisticated dashboard of information that 
people can access and actually find and track an awful lot about how their royalties are being 
earned. So that is gonna be a big part of the future. But to get there you gotta come together and 
work together on solutions because doing that individually (as an individual society) does not 
help, because if you are a songwriter, yes, you've got a society; but your rights are then plugged 
into the wider network and the last thing you want as a songwriter is bearing in mind that it's all 
working off commissions of your income (on one level or another) the last thing you want is 
multiple investments being made in a similar technology for the sake of it! You want the society 
network to come together - invest once, or a few times only, in solutions and make sure that then 
it really fits for purpose.  
But definitely, this point about, as an industry with publishers and CMOs with the sort of 
‘leading’ writers, that group is obviously aware about all the developments but it’s crucial that 
we don’t leave behind the wider constituent group. They need to understand the developments 
that are happening and that it is definitely an area to focus on and improve moving forward. 
 
KEFALAS: Alright thank you so much for this interview and for taking the time to talk to me. 
MCEWEN: No , not at all! 
 
KEFALAS: Will Page (a friend of my professor Roger Wallis, suggested that you would be a 
great candidate for this because you are a ‘brilliant brain and ace licensor’ so… 
 
MCEWEN: Hahahaha!  
 
KEFALAS: Really happy I got to talk to you and uhm..best of luck and keep up the good work, I 
guess! And hopefully talk to you again sometime! 
 
MCEWEN: Yeah, sure! And as I said, I probably waffled on unhelpfully but if there are other 
things that come up as you are doing your research that you wanna clarify or that you want to 
chat on then feel free. 
 
KEFALAS: No, I think your brainstorming was what I was after! Thank you so much Ben, have 
a great day! 
 
MCEWEN: Good stuff! Best of luck with all, cheers, bye! 
 
 End.  
  
Interview 4: Graham Davies  
 
KEFALAS: I would first like to thank you for agreeing to this interview! I will  begin with the 
first question.  
 
DAVIES: Sure!  
 
KEFALAS: We have seen attempts to shift the old solutions from the analogue into the digital 
world, using a system that a lot of critics suggest that it functioned well in the analogue world. 
To what extent does that function in today’s digital industry? 
 
DAVIES:So, I think that the question of a sustainable digital economy is absolutely the right 
thing to look at and I think it is the case that we should look at how the market has evolved. In 
relation to music, that has been a cause of concern. And absolutely, as you are talking about, 
what is it from the analog world, is fit for purpose in the digital world.. Now, from the PRS 
perspective as an organization representing rights holders, we have always sought to understand 
the market and generally we take a license first kind of posture. So that would be: The online 
market is evolving. We are not quite sure how it is going to evolve but there is a huge 
opportunity in terms of consumption with new businesses etc. And absolutely, what we have 
seen is that consumption of music is exponentially bigger in the digital world. There are so many 
ways different ways that people can access music. So, i think we are one of the first societies to 
issue an online license. And we have tried to support new business models whether that is 
Spotify or Youtube or Downloads as well. So I think our approach is to say that there are new 
businesses and they should be licensed. Recently what we have done is we have undertaken a 
strategic review to see how the market has actually evolved. Has it evolved as we expected it to 
and are we getting value the way that we are approaching it? (as we should). What we found is 
that there is a value gap between how the market functions and how people make profit from that 
market versus what is being returned to rights holders. So we do see a value gap and trying to 
understand why is there a value gap and what is the size of that gap. We actually did go back to 
the first principles from a law and economics perspective so what we are talking about here is the 
remuneration of music based on copyright. Copyright is the mechanism. I suppose what you 
have to ask yourself here is: Is copyright fit for purpose in a digital age? 
 
KEFALAS: I have to say that I asked something similar to Jane Dyball and she  said that 
copyright is fine and the legal structures are hard to change. .. 
 
DAVIES: Well I think looking at that question from the law and economics perspective we 
agree. This is actually, copyright is not of perfect means of valuing and remunerating creators 
but it is probably the best of the means that are around there. And what it does is it seeks to draw 
a balance between consumption of creative output where it's in the public good for them to have. 
A sort of free access to that for educational means and various sorts of exemptions to copyright 
but then copyright kicks in and the market determines the value of it. Here, how these safe 
harbor exemptions are interpreted by players in the market is something problematic. Because 
when music is uploaded, accessed, communicated, broadcast whatever you want to describe that 
there should be consent given from the owner of that copyright for that consumption to take 
 place. If that principle is kept then the market should settle around a commercial value that is the 
right value. So going back to the very first principles, we see that that has been one of the 
inhibitors of there being a valuing of music in the online consumption space. If that can be 
altered there are lots of practical and operational issues (databases, micro-licensing mechanisms). 
Does all of that content need to be licensed and remunerated on a transactional basis or not? Is 
there a blanket license model? All of those things..  And also the global licensing. Because music 
online is multi-territory. There are a lot of practical industry change issues that come with that. 
But what you really need to start with is the core of copyright. Can copyright be a sustainable 
model in the online market in the future? This needs to be supported by law and regulation. That 
is where a lot of our strategy has been focused. 
 
KEFALAS: I see… Do you think the digital economy has been growing in Europe?  
 
DAVIES: Well, yes, but is that net growth? So, if Google grows that is not Europe but even for 
Google’s Europe turnover, how many other businesses are reducing? So, how does that net out, 
you know? So we license Spotify, we license Apple, we license a whole series of online services. 
But I think, how bigger would that digital market be if the parasitic growth was not so strong? 
 
KEFALAS: Previous attempts between societies to adapt in digital were based on collaboration. 
For example the Santiago agreement would extend the offline system to online. Why do you 
think that did not work out?   
 
DAVIES: The Santiago agreement was amongst societies and I would say the key difference 
with the option 3 from recommendation from the European Commission and the rights holders 
acting on that is to exercise their direct control over the pricing and licensing of their rights on a 
multi territorial basis and not leaving those rights with the CMOs. And that is part of what we 
have been looking at. We have bundles of rights being licensed and priced separately. That is a 
very very different world to how the societies and the network have been running before. And it 
has given rights to huge amounts of complexity. Now, PRS's response to that was to say that not 
all societies responded in favor of option 3. We did. And we said: any other option is going to 
de-value copyright. So, competition for rights is a better way to safeguard the value of copyright. 
And we went out saying: This is our strategy and our solutions, not just for us but for the 
industry about how we can make this work. 
 
 
KEFALAS: Many people considered the GRD as a solution some years ago, which in theory 
would be very helpful towards standardizing data as well as bringing together all those unique 
codes for ownership identification (ISWC, ISRC etc.) Could you tell me a little bit more about 
that project and why ICE followed after?  
 
DAVIES: Well, PRS was in the working group for the GRD from the start and ICE was selected 
as a solution. A technology solution. We funded this to make it happen and we continue to 
develop ICE as a solution. We have always believed in GRD because we understand how the 
complexity when the multi-territorial licensing comes from having a real time, clear view on 
who owns what. The other thing you need is to have more bundling. If most rights are 
fragmenting you also have to have a system where you can bundle those rights back together for 
 the licensee, in a way of invoicing those rights in a uniform way. And that gives more guarantee 
to licensees that they will only be charged the right amount of money for clearing the blanket 
rights that they need. So we have put forward our extension to ICE now which is an online 
licensing from end as well as options for people to pull on the back office through their very 
special purpose being of course licensing.. So we have put forward what we think: the structures 
that the industry needs. 
  
 
KEFALAS: Have other CMOs followed this direction? 
 
 
DAVIES: We have sought to engage as many CMOs as possible in our strategy but at the same 
time in order to get something done you have to… get on with it! So we have built the structures 
whilst at the same time keeping the other CMOs aware of it! So, we now have BUMA as a 
customer of ICE, SABAM have a commitment to looking at  becoming a member and a 
customer of ICE, we have the rest of the Nordic societies actively looking at joining ICE and 
then now we also have interest from outside Europe with other societies actively looking at ICE. 
So, back to your point which is that: if option 3 and the rights holders ability to have control over 
their rights for multi-territorial licensing is the world… This is the environment. And that is in 
the interest of the value of copyright. So our job is to make it work. It is taking a long time but I 
think with the competition clearance, only a month ago we are very soon going to operating in 
the market with ICE  providing a front office and back office solutions. So, you know.. that will 
then grow and we are very confident, both in terms of increasingly standardizing copyright 
ownership information but also scaling up the licensing services. Because the goal here is global 
licensing, not just pan-European. It's one stop shop. 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: So seeing how things have evolved… are you positive?  
 
DAVIES: I think.. Yes.. I am positive because there have been lots of views about how things 
should evolve. But i think that gradually there is this general acceptance that if you are going to 
have a fragmented rights picture then you have to have ways of enabling that but with 
standardization and I think your point about ICE,  ISWC and ISRC.. It is very frustrating to us 
that that is not standardized.. Our view is that data and reference data needs to be authoritative. 
One place for that makes complete sense. That is why we were big fans of the GRD. The GRD 
having both ISRC and ISWC linked together. Audio-visual data is also a project that we are 
working on to extend ICE's ability there so, for us, the more that data can be held centrally 
(once) and used by everybody then it will enable to kind of put in the front of that some 
individual licensing entities just representing smaller 'pockets of rights'. If you don't have that 
standardization it's incredibly complicated and it creates a very bad service for the users. Because 
they don't know who to go to get the rights, they don't know if they have cleared all the rights, 
they don't know if they have valued the rights properly etc. And on a global basis that's very 
challenging.  
 
 
 KEFALAS: With all those data issues that societies are aware of, and with the recent EU 
Directive on CMOs focusing a lot on transparency.  How transparent can a CMO be at the 
moment, in terms of providing correct information about royalties, for example? Is that a 
challenge?  
 
DAVIES: I don't think the challenges and complexity of the system causes a challenge for 
transparency. I can only talk from the PRS perspective here.. We have always put transparency 
very high in importance and… there are no problems for us because we have nothing to hide. 
Uhm… I can't see why other societies would have an issue either. I mean, we exist for our 
members’ rights. We are in the business of licensing and distributing and all of the info around 
that is info we provide to our members and the governance is clearly constructed with visibility 
from members so.. I think that there is always more info you can give and more info we 
absolutely would like to give. It also needs to be useful insight rather than swamping people with 
data you are not always becoming more transparent.. So what we are looking at at the moment: 
we had trillions of lines of data for different types of members and we need to make sure we are 
giving them all the information that is helpful for them to run their businesses and now we are 
working actively on developing a website portal to be able to give as much information as we 
possibly can to our members. But I would say that at the moment we already try to do that in an 
offline capacity.  
 
 
KEFALAS: On a national level it is much easier to be very transparent but isn't it difficult to 
understand what money you are getting when it is in many different places? 
 
DAVIES: Yeah...so that is a challenge. There's a couple of things here.. So in the online space it 
is right to say that the rights that the PRS represents are going into a number of different deals. 
So that  can mean that the amount of royalty that one member gets it is quite difficult to 
understand what is that money for, for which services, which countries, over which periods and 
how do I value that. So I think that is definitely a challenge. A challenge to be able to explain 
what a member is getting. I think that our position is that a PRS membership really does, I 
suppose, give you guarantees that you may not necessarily get elsewhere. So, our rights are very 
valuable in the international sphere. We have been licensing rights on a near global basis for 
many years. Our rights in all of the major deals and we can ensure that we get good value for our 
members. Whilst, a lot of those deals have non-disclosure agreements around them cause they 
are commercial deals and obviously competition in the market means that quite rightly one 
publisher's deal cannot be visible to another publisher etc. So what we have operated is a number 
of structures that can make this work. So we have business separation within PRS and within 
ICE ventures. Then we also have some scrutiny in our board who are able to ensure looking 
across all of the deals that we are doing and that we are making sure that we are safe-guarding 
member value. Because you have to remember, when a writer joins PRS they assign that right to 
PRS so then we are representing them and have to make sure that we are getting the right value 
or else we will not be happy. So, that is an area that is more complex than the national structures.  
 
 
KEFALAS: One of my main objectives for coming to London for my placement was to find out 
if the people who represent the creators, like you, Jane Dyball etc. know what is going on.. And 
 it seems that the PRS is aware of a lot of these things…  
 
DAVIES: Interested in seeing your thesis when it is completed! It would be great if you send it 
to me because I think.. This is a very dynamic market and industry, you know? And I think there 
is an element here that all markets are also now much more dynamic and hyper competitive and 
the reason is also because of the digital revolution that is speeding through into all demands. And 
the ability for companies to start up quickly.. you know, it is all about data, technology and so 
you have got CMOs where their network is around 100 years old. So, we are doing our very best 
to be open to understanding what the right responses to the change are. What our strategy is and 
things that we think can succeed (on behalf of our rights holders) is to be open to ideas that there 
could be different ways! There are things like 'creative commons', rights holders taking rights 
back, there are different sort of models coming through where there are Global Music Rights 
CMOs.. so you know, how can the society add value is the thing that we are ALWAYS looking 
at. So, we only undertake activity on behalf of our members so long it's in their interest in doing 
so. And I think in the online environment it's you know.. I came from a meeting earlier this 
morning where we were talking about global licensing and solutions in the production music 
market. You know, that is all about the general sort of move of big tech companies.. Asking 
questions like: what is the future of broadcasting? Now broadcasting is converging (meets, 
intersect, going parallel) with online. Netflix are producing content which is now online first and 
then it gets indicated onto the terrestrial platforms.. Base production want content licensed on a 
global basis-all rights clear.. That was immediately something we had to look at. Because we 
have to, that is the direction of travel! But the key thing is: how do you support rights holders to 
get their very best out of an affecting new way that music is being used? 
 
 
KEFALAS: Are there any ways...?  
 
 
DAVIES: There are but unfortunately they are very complicated. Now, one of them is not very 
complicated and that is that the rights holder leaves the CMO. So they pull their rights out and do 
it themselves. 
 
KEFALAS: Direct licensing is one way then… 
 
DAVIES: Yes.. with direct licensing. That is one way. The alternative way is for the collective 
(CMO) to come up with solutions which mean that rights can be left within the collective but 
also licensed on a global basis. I think it's back to what we were talking about with the online 
'licensing complexity'. 
 
KEFALAS: Is there any entity that can issue a pan-european license right now? You were 
talking about global licensing but I don't think we have this on a pan-european scale, do we? 
 
DAVIES: We do actually. We have been doing that for over 5 years, probably more! 
 
KEFALAS: I meant something like the Santiago agreement where if you go to the UK or Spain 
you would get the same rates.. 
  
DAVIES: Ok, yeah... So that would have been on an option 2 basis from the Recommendation. 
That is where go to one CMO they represent the global repertoire and you can go to any society 
and they could do the deal. The reason we did not support that is because you go to SGAE and 
they say: we'll do it for 10cents and then go to SABAM and they say: hold on, we can do it for 9! 
So the price can go down and that means that the price of the copyright goes down..So now what 
you are able to do is: You are not able to get the blanket license on a pan-european basis but you 
can get PRS's repertoire licensed on a Pan-European basis. 
 
KEFALAS: Do you see that happening now with Gema and Stim? a blanket license for all three? 
Given that you have ICE kind of sorted and you are in conjunction? 
 
DAVIES: In the future that is the plan, yes. We have been licensing our repertoire both directly 
and also in conjunction with SONY, EMI, also our rights flow into a deal with SACEM and 
Universal. This is all on pan-european basis.. So that is there. Global though is another kind of 
fish. We do almost global licenses excluding USA, Canada and some other territories but I think 
it is just that (and the whole point is), that is the direction of travel and I suppose.. You know 
what? It is quite exciting! It's a very dynamic business. You know, what worked last year may 
not work next year. That is where the challenge is. Because you have big societies, big 
investments and platforms. Here you want data standardized, THAT is a challenge. You have to 
get everybody to join up on that. 
 
 
KEFALAS: Sounds exciting in theory but very difficult in practice.. 
DAVIES: Very difficult! But i suppose it is back to: What capabilities do we need? We need 
people that can handle complexity, so, if I talk about my team, you know. There are people that 
can quickly get to groups with what is a very complicated scenario. These people have to talk to 
people who don't know anything about the music industry and explain copyright. You would not 
desire this business! 
 
 
KEFALAS: From recent figures it seems that performance income is going up and mechanical 
down. Has the performance income been compensating for the loss of mechanical? 
 
 
DAVIES: Ok, so yes, absolutely the mechanical income has been dropping obviously due to 
recorded media decline of CDs and DVDs etc although there has been a slight 'up tick' recently 
which is quite nice because the other element is downloads which have been declining and we 
also need to kind of think what impact will Apple Music with their new streaming service 
actually precipitate, cause something could happen quickly or suddenly, because the download 
market is heavily iTunes. So, it would be interesting to see if that will have a ticking point impact 
on the rest of downloads. So, obviously mechanicals are involved in a lot  of territories in terms 
of licensing of streaming. There is a mechanical right but not in every territory and in the same 
proportion. More or less it is the same but in some territories like France is a bit weird in terms 
of the split of revenue. On the streaming side they have gone very heavily mechanical, so, yeah, 
the trajectory is performing income has strengthened against that. In terms of PRS's revenue it is 
 divided as such: you've got public performance sales (domestic blanket licensing, live venues), 
broadcasting, we have online which some of it is licensed in other territories and some on a 
national basis, we have recorded media and then international money (the money that CMOs 
overseas collect from public performance, broadcast and online for us). So, in terms of the 
strength i think that broadcast has always been relatively flat and stable (a bit of growth there 
recently). But really the growth we have been seeing was coming through international but the 
other areas (public performance sales for BBC, so even more penetration of the UK market). We 
are discussing potential collaboration with PPL.. 
 
KEFALAS: And they use the ISRC codes.. 
 
DAVIES: Exactly, so we have to find a link there. One of the challenge with the ISRC from my 
understanding is that they are issued by the record companies. 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: But there is no link between these too and it remains a bit confusing I guess. Is there 
a way to tackle this challenge? 
 
DAVIES: We would love it to happen but i think the problem is: who is going to give us the 
ISRC? That's the issue.. I mean, if the record industry basically appointed PPL to do that and 
issue them then it could start to work if we could connect with them!  My understanding is that 
now it's the individual record companies who issue ISRCs some of those codes are duplicating 
and it is just goes poof!  
 
KEFALAS: Could there be any government intervention to say: we have to make things simpler 
here for our creators and common benefit (in EU level)? 
 
DAVIES: There could be, i mean, the nearest we had that kind of intervention was on the GRD. 
Which was supposed to be recordings as well as works (ISRC and ISWC together) but you can 
see how the regulators have not had any teeth with that. They said: you need to do it and it put 
lots of pressure on and we tried to make it happen and it stopped! 
 
KEFALAS: Where do you see the industry in 10 years from now? A better or worse place for the 
creators? More or less remuneration? More or less power for the CMOs ? Where is this whole 
thing going to? 
 
DAVIES: I think that there will be quite a bit of change. I think that the role of the CMOs will 
change. If we look at some of the trends what we have is: creators, rights holders and new 
entities where rights holders can put their rights. An example is GMR and Kobalt-Amra. You 
know, so there is this fragmentation of rights and there are for a special purpose being caused.. 
So what we are seeing is a very dynamic US market being increasingly in turmoil. So in 10 years 
time the US market will have changed and I think that we will see that if you take PRS we will 
have outsourced a lot of what we currently do to hub solutions which enable them to scale and 
get uniformity in the market, in the industry with those kinds of scale benefits/data benefits and 
all that. So I think that in 10 years time that will have consolidated a lot more, at least for us.. 
 Other societies will have started to use the hub as a service provider;I think what that then means 
is that CMOs will be representing smaller or more sort of focused factors of rights holders as 
well as, as i said, other entities will have moved into that market as well. They may not be 
societies but they will be groupings of rights holders.. In that regard, whether it will be better or 
worse for the rights holders I think there will probably be more choice and I think more 
competition. Competition has the potential to make things better but I think some of the 
challenges related to it could still be there, you know, more competetion and fragmentation could 
mean more complexity. Actually, with rights holders been part of CMOs they have had 
protection so whether joining non-society solutions will bring increased risk to the long term 
control and value for rights holders, that is something that needs to be thought about. 
 
KEFALAS: I guess at this stage it would be very difficult to start things from the beginning…  
 
DAVIES: I mean, I agree.. yeah.. There are structures that have taken 100 years to establish 
aren't they? You would not design things from this point in time. But about disintermediation, 
absolutely. From PRS's perspective we are very focused on how do we add value. Our role is 
going to be changed significantly through moving a lot of what we currently do to hubs and 
joined ventures etc. Then we come down to the question: what is our role? Is it the same for 
other societies? How can they add value in a disintermediated world? I still think that there is a 
role of rights holders have greatly benefited from the security that being part of the Collective 
has given them. I think if writers are then in effect, putting all of their rights in a publisher etc 
obviously that could be a great thing. It moves a lot of the trust i suppose into the publishing 
contract. 
 
 
KEFALAS: But.. are the CMOs going to survive through this complexity? Can a Collective 
retain their principles in the future? It has always been fascinating to me, the historical, 
traditional institutions and how they promote creativity and being the bearers of culture if you 
will. Is that going to change? 
 
 
DAVIES: Yeah, absolutely, so.. I think it is about what is their role. What you just described is 
the role of the CMO. I think in relation to the online issues we talked about, you know, we have 
been focusing on that issue by saying: Your rights have not been valued properly, we need to 
lobby for a regulation, we need to do these various things. So I suppose that being the champion 
of the creator, that when you talk about the CMOs role they are actually coming from a vertically 
integrated past where they did..everything. A society did everything, registered works, licensed 
etc. They did everything. For some societies at the moment they will still be operating that 
model, the model of doing everything. PRS has progressively been outsourcing and has plans to 
outsource almost everything else in terms of back office and front office activities (licensing). 
So, we are already on that path of transformation and the reason we did that, you know, we sat 
the strategy 5 years ago which was: this is how we see success in the future, having a very 
different role. Some of that role is exactly the same which is being an advocate for our rights 
holders to ensure that they get the best value, their rights are protected and they have control.. 
whatever makes sense. That is the bit we will hold on to but whether we are doing the licensing, 
collecting the data, managing the data, processing the data, those activities we judge are better 
 scaled up. And then our rights holders will get the value of more efficient, lower cost, all of that. 
 
 
 
KEFALAS: So there is future but with a lot of change.. 
 
DAVIES: It is a different future.. You know what? that makes sense doesn't it? Because we have 
such a changing world and the digital revolution is enormous. How can a society continue to do 
what is has always done? 
 
 
KEFALAS: I suppose the most important thing is to allow change whilst maintaining the 
values... 
 
DAVIES: Yes! That is the bit we try to hold on to but that is also being changed. So what I am 
saying is in the future (that we already are now) different entities sort of saying: look, we'll pull 
on the back office stuff as well but we will compete for that membership. And our question is: 
that's competing with different values. Which one serves rights holders best in the long term? 
That will be the interesting bit! 
 
 
KEFALAS: Thank you so much! 
 
DAVIES: Thank you too, if there is any follow up just drop me an email and best of luck with it! 
I did an MBA myself and writing the dissertation was.. ugh! there is a lot on the dissertation isn't 
there? 
 
KEFALAS: In this area, very much so.  I will have to narrow down the selected topics based on 
theory and your input which is of course very valuable!  
 
DAVIES: Ok cool! No problem at all!  
 
KEFALAS: With all these challenges, I have to say likewise! Thanks Graham.  
 
DAVIES: Best of luck!  
 
End.  
 
